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ABSTRACT
The data are shocking and familiar. A grossly disproportionate
number of youth in the juvenile justice system are children of color,
and black youth, at only sixteen percent of the population, are the
group most overrepresented at every stage. An African-American boy
is nine times more likely to be detained for a drug offense as a white
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boy charged with the exact same offense, and has a one in three
chance of being sent to prison during his lifetime. These statistics
stand despite widespread acknowledgment that the overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system cannot be explained by offense rates, which are static across racial and ethnic
groups; arrest rates, which hover near an all-time low; or demographics, which yield this pattern of overrepresentation even in
states with very small populations of people of color.
The often overlooked history of the treatment of black systeminvolved children begins to give these statistics dimension. In its
1967 decision, In re Gault, the Court gave youths in delinquency
proceedings the right to counsel as an extension of Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental fairness instead of applying the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights. The Gault Court did this because it failed to fold the realities of the treatment of system-involved
black children into its calculus of the process due in juvenile delinquency proceedings.
In this way, Gault splintered juvenile justice reform off from the
Civil Rights Movement. The conventional narrative relates that the
Civil Rights Movement demanded an end to racial discrimination
in the criminal justice system, and that the Supreme Court responded with an array of constitutional protections that form the basis of
our modern system of criminal procedure. But curiously, the Court
stopped short of extending these reforms to another area of the criminal justice system that leaders of the Civil Rights Movement believed
required reform: the juvenile justice system. Civil rights leaders understood the juvenile justice system as a symbol of racial subordination to be torn down, like public schools, voting discrimination, and
segregated places of public accommodation.
This Article argues that if the Court had been more attentive to the
disparate treatment of black children in the juvenile justice system,
then it would have been more likely to root juvenile court protections
in the Bill of Rights because the Court would have recognized the
disparate treatment as a form of racism—the same kind of racism
that the Court had been addressing in its criminal procedure reforms
rooted in the Bill of Rights. An example of the abiding effect of the
Court’s jurisprudential miscalculation can be found in a comparison of the Court’s holdings in two cases that considered provision of
the jury trial right. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court extended
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right to defendants in state criminal
proceedings. But in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held
that juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Gault’s great deficiency is that it erected a flawed prototype that allowed future courts to turn a blind eye to race disparities in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Replacing that prototype with a better one
will not itself cure juvenile courts’ deficiencies, but it will create an
institutional environment in which a wide range of players can
work more effectively toward a wide range of cures for many of the
problems.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 1899 in Chicago, Illinois, the country’s first juvenile
court heard its first case. 1 Henry Campbell, an eleven-year-old boy,
2
stood accused of larceny. White, poor, and, according to his tearful
mother, a boy who was “not a ‘bad boy at heart’” but who had been
3
“led into trouble by others,” Henry was exactly the kind of child that
motivated the Child Savers, a group of Progressive reformers, to campaign for the establishment of a separate juvenile system dedicated to
4
rehabilitation instead of punishment. The Child Savers envisioned
the juvenile judge as a child welfare expert who would, like a benevolent, firm-handed parent, fashion individualized sentences to rehabili5
tate the wayward children who appeared before him. In Henry’s
case, Judge Richard Tuthill, a Civil War veteran, was happy to oblige.
After Henry’s mother spoke in his defense, the judge sent Henry to

1. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND

VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 93 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/

ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf; see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE
IN THE MAKING

23 (2004).

2. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 23–24.
3. Id. at 24.
4. See id. at 24–25 (explaining that the judge in the Campbell case had discretion to
order the boy into the custody of his grandmother rather than send him to a juvenile reformatory); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE
JUSTICE 77–78 (2012) (noting that Progressive Era reformers can be credited with developing the modern juvenile court, focused on preventing delinquency through rehabilitation).
5. WARD, supra note 4, at 78.
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live with his grandmother in Rome, New York, where he could have a
6
fresh start.
Fourteen-year-old James Robinson did not fare as well. History
does not reveal James’s crime, but it does reveal his punishment: In
1902, the black teenager was leased to a Georgia plantation called
7
Kinderlou. James’s sister Carrie Kinsey wrote a letter to President
Theodore Roosevelt asking for the government’s assistance when lo8
cal authorities would not help her retrieve her brother. “Mr. Prassident,” wrote Mrs. Kinsey, “They wont let me have him. . . . He hase
not don nothing for them to have him in chanes so I rite to you for
9
your help.” The nascent juvenile justice system contemplated starkly
different treatment for white children and children of color, because
the Child Savers’ vision did not include providing individualized re10
habilitative services for children of color. Simply put, black children
were black before they were children, and therefore exempt from the
11
presumption that they were amenable to rehabilitation. In 1903,
just four years after Henry was sent to live with his grandmother,
James was allowed to escape the plantation when the McRees, the
family that owned Kinderlou, learned that the United States Department of Justice was about to begin investigating allegations of “ex12
treme cruelty” at the plantation.
Half a century later, the Civil Rights Movement presented the
promise of reconciling these differences so that black children ac6. TANENHAUS, supra note 1, at 23–24.
7. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II at 8, 252 (2008). For an explanation of convict leasing, see infra Section I.B.2.
8. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 8–9.
9. Id.
10. See WARD, supra note 4, at 73–74 (noting that reformers focused on white children,
and that black children remained subject to institutionalization with adults); NAT’L
COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
OF

YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2007), available at http://www.nccd

global.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/justice-for-some.pdf.
11. See id. (explaining that reformation “for white children came first” and that black
children were often incarcerated with adults).
12. The conditions were indeed cruel: “The men slept each night in the same clothes
they wore in the fields, on rotting mattresses infested with pests. Many were chained to
their beds. Food was crude and minimal. Punishment for the disobedient was to be
strapped onto a log lying on their backs, while a guard spanked their bare feet with a plank
of wood.” BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 251–52.
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cused of crime might receive the nuanced, benevolent attention that
13
the juvenile justice system promised to white youth. The Supreme
Court responded to the pressures of the Civil Rights Movement by extending, via the Due Process Clause, the protections of the Bill of
14
Rights to all adult defendants in state criminal proceedings. But in
15
In re Gault, the seminal case that gave youths in delinquency proceedings the right to counsel, the Court set juvenile court jurisprudence on a different path. Instead of applying the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights, the Court extended juvenile delinquency
16
respondents only Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.
In this way, Gault splintered juvenile justice reform off from the
Civil Rights Movement. An example of the abiding effect of the
Court’s jurisprudential miscalculation can be found in a comparison
of the Court’s holdings in two cases that considered provision of the
17
jury trial right. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court extended the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right to defendants in state criminal proceed18
19
ings. But in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that juveniles
do not have the right to a jury trial under the Fourteenth Amend20
Commentators have attacked McKeiver since it was anment.
21
22
nounced, criticizing it as “ripe for overruling,” and “suspect and
13. WARD, supra note 4, at 200.
14. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury to the states), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to the
states), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment
Right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure to the states).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. Id. at 41.
17. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
18. Id. at 149–50.
19. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
20. Id. at 545.
21. See, e.g., Jury Trials in Juvenile Proceedings, 85 HARV. L. REV. 113, 118 (1971) (calling
the Court’s consideration of the jury’s role “incomplete,” and listing the “other functions”
that a jury can “serve . . . in the juvenile process that cannot be subsumed under the factfinding rubric”); Orman W. Ketcham, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: the Last Word on Juvenile
Court Adjudications?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 560, 568–701 (1972) (discussing the impact
McKeiver may have on the juvenile justice system); Comment, Juvenile Right to Jury Trial—
Post McKeiver, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 605, 606 (1971) (discussing the possible “constitutional
infirmities” of McKeiver); Note, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: A Retreat in Juvenile Justice, 38
BROOK. L. REV. 650, 651 (1972) (calling the McKeiver decision “unsound”). In R.L.R. v.
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23

outdated.” The critics have several grounds, including the Court’s
24
anemic due process analysis, the tension between the denial of the
juvenile jury trial right and the United States Supreme Court’s rulings
25
in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny, the increase in challenges to
McKeiver’s continuing validity in light of recent procrustean punish26
ments for juvenile delinquents, and the re-examination of the scope
State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska, 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the Court’s holding
in McKeiver and granted juvenile defendants the right to jury trial. Id. at 35.
22. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence
Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1224 (2003) (stating that “[a]s every commentator and many
courts have noted, McKeiver’s uncritical and out-dated plurality decision is ripe for overruling”); see also In re Javier A., 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (commenting that
the continued denial of the constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings “is
not just ripe for Supreme Court reconsideration, it is overripe”).
23. See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 306 (2007) (commenting that “[d]ecades of case law
and studies on jury versus judicial factfinding make the McKeiver plurality opinion seem
even more suspect and out-dated”).
24. Some have gone so far as to suggest that juveniles should have the right to a jury
trial in juvenile proceedings, that juvenile court should be abolished entirely because of
the absence of the jury trial right, or that the juvenile court does not actually protect children at all and that minors might see better outcomes and receive better protection in
criminal court. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal
Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1118–20 (1991) (stating that the juvenile courts should be abolished as the costs associated with the “procedural informality” of juvenile court may be more harmful to children than if they face charges
in criminal court); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for
the Preservation of Children’s Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 49–50 (1990) (noting that children
could receive more rights and protections in criminal court and still be eligible for treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment if the juvenile courts were abolished);
Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723 (1991) (arguing that the abolishment of the juvenile court would allow for criminal court proceedings to provide minor defendants with the same protections as adult defendants).
25. The Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), has been a catalyst in the recent resurgence of interest in the juvenile jury trial right. In Apprendi, the
Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction” must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and submitted to a jury. Id.
at 490. Subsequent cases have held firm to this bright-line rule.
26. These include, most notably, lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles adjudicated guilty of serious, often consensual, sex offenses. See In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204,
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of the rehabilitative function of juvenile court proceedings attendant
to the recent series of juvenile Eighth Amendment cases before the
27
United States Supreme Court. But the problem is not McKeiver. The
problem is Gault.
This Article will argue that Gault’s reliance on a fundamental
fairness analysis based in Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis, instead of on a fundamental rights analysis based in the Bill of

214 (R.I. 2008) (finding that “the nature of the juvenile-justice system is not significantly
compromised by a sex-offender-registration requirement” and upholding Rhode Island’s
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act as constitutional as applied to
juveniles, but cautioning that “perhaps the better rule with respect to juveniles would be to
provide the trial justice with the discretion to determine whether a respondent who has
reached twenty-one years of age should be required to register as a sex offender”); In re
Jeremy P., 692 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that sex offender registration was not criminal punishment and, therefore, the respondent had no right to a jury
trial under either the federal or Wisconsin state constitution); see In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311,
325 (Cal. 2004) (noting that “[r]egistration has not historically been viewed as punishment, imposes no direct disability or restraint beyond the inconvenience of compliance,
and has a legitimate nonpenal objective” and that the incidental retributive effects of registration “are not sufficient to outweigh the statute’s regulatory nature”); People ex rel. J.T.,
13 P.3d 321, 323 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that a juvenile respondent facing registration
did not have the right to a jury trial because the statutory duty to register as a sex offender
did not constitute criminal punishment). Other punishments for juvenile delinquents include: potential enhancement of future criminal sentences, ineligibility for student loans,
disqualification from public benefits, including housing and other assistance, and ineligibility to enlist in the military. See Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 570
(2004) (discussing examples of housing authorities that check juvenile records); Michael
Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006); Robert E. Shepherd, Collateral
Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings: Part II, 15 CRIM. JUST. 41, 41–42 (2000) (describing how
juvenile adjudications negatively impact eligibility for military enlistment).
27. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that mandatory life
without the possibility of parole for those who were under eighteen at the commission of
their crime violates the Eight Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034
(2010) (holding that the imposition of life without the possibility of parole sentences in
juvenile non-homicide cases violates the Eight Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 578 (2005) (holding that the execution of a juvenile offender younger than eighteen
years of age at the time of the commission of a capital offense violates the Eight Amendment).
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28

Rights, was a critical misstep. This was a misstep rooted in the conventional narrative depicting the juvenile justice system as a benevo29
lent vehicle for the rehabilitation of children. What this conventional narrative overlooked was the starkly different experiences that
30
children of color had in the juvenile justice system. The Court attended only to the dominant narrative, which pertained to white chil31
dren. In so doing, and in failing to understand the unique position
of children of color in the system, it further marginalized these con32
stituents. This misstep was the first of two points forming a straight
line between the Child Savers’ story and Gault’s adoption of funda33
mental fairness. The Court’s attention to the dominant narrative
34
split juvenile rights from the Court’s criminal procedure revolution.
This critical mistake would serve to perpetuate, rather than redress,
35
the legacy of disparate treatment of black system-involved children.
Part I will briefly recount the Child Savers’ juvenile court origin
story, and an alternate origin story focusing on the treatment of black
children, who are the most disproportionately represented youth
population in juvenile court. Part II will discuss the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gault and the divergent paths the Court
took in criminal and juvenile cases during the Court’s due process
revolution and the Civil Rights Movement. Part III will juxtapose
McKeiver and Duncan, to illustrate that Gault’s reliance on Fourteenth
Amendment due process has allowed juvenile justice jurisprudence to
take a back seat to adult criminal protections. Part IV will conclude
with a discussion of the world that Gault created, and how this legacy
of discrimination continues to operate in modern-day juvenile court.
I. JUVENILE COURT: ORIGINS
Examining the history of the juvenile court provides insight into
the evolution of the doctrine upon which the modern-day juvenile
court rests. History reveals that the story of the Child Savers and their
successful campaign for a separate juvenile court does not encompass
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See infra Part I.
31. See infra Part I.
32. See infra Part I.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.
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the lowered expectations for and harsher treatment of black children
36
accused of crimes. Given the history of how black children fared in
the juvenile justice system, it is no wonder that a legacy of minority
overrepresentation and disparate provision of services continues to
37
vex the system today.
A. The Child Savers and the Origins of the Juvenile Justice System
The story of how the Child Savers campaigned for a specialized
juvenile court is well known. 38 The beginnings of the juvenile court
movement can be traced to the 1822 Report on the Penitentiary System in the United States by the Society for the Prevention of Pauper39
ism. The Society was comprised of a group of Quaker reformers focused on “alleviat[ing] the suffering of the poor in their
40
communities.” Targeting the areas of education and criminal justice, they established schools for “the poorer classes” and introduced
41
reform legislation that reduced the number of capital offenses. The
Society’s Report condemned the practice of incarcerating children
42
with adults. The same group of reformers followed that first report
with an 1823 report that “called for the rescue of children from a fu43
ture of crime and degradation.”
In response, in 1824 the New York legislature granted to the Society, now called the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents, authority to build the New York House of Refuge, which

36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. For discussion on the Child Savers, see generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE
AND THE

TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999) ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE

CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3 (1969) (discussing the “child savers”
role in the creation of the juvenile court); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS:
RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE 6 (2012) (discussing the Progressive Era’s “child
saving movement” from the perspective of black juveniles); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1991) (discussing the “childsavers” view of the juvenile court).
39. Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1189 (1970).
40. Id. at 1188–89.
41. Id. at 1188.
42. Id. at 1189.
43. Id.
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opened in 1825. Dubbed “the first great event in child welfare,”
the House of Refuge was the country’s first dedicated juvenile treatment facility. The House of Refuge “offer[ed] food, shelter, and education to the homeless and destitute youth of New York, and . . . remov[ed] juvenile offenders from the prison company of adult
46
convicts.” The charter for the House of Refuge was clear that only
“proper objects”—boys who were deemed salvageable—were to be
47
admitted. The Society’s overarching goal was to save their young
charges from a future of criminal involvement by diagnosing and cur48
ing symptoms of predelinquency. Considered more victims than offenders, youth would be able to cast off the influence of their parents’
49
“indolen[t]” examples and armor their vulnerability to the caprice
of the city by internalizing the Society’s counterexample of law50
abiding citizenship.
Enter the Child Savers. The Child Savers were a group of Progressive reformers who successfully advocated for the creation of the
51
nation’s first separate juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois in 1899.
Motivated by enlightened ideals concerning the reconstruction of
childhood, appalled by the treatment youths suffered in adult jails
and prisons, and convinced that youth misbehavior could be diagnosed and treated as easily as physical pathology, the Child Savers led
52
a crusade on behalf of wayward, indigent children. Reduced to its

44. Id. at 1187, 1189–90.
45. Id. at 1187.
46. Id. at 1189.
47. Id. at 1190.
48. Id. at 1190–91.
49. Id. at 1189.
50. Id. at 1190–91. An 1823 report noted:
Many of these are young people on whom the charge of crime cannot be fastened, and whose only fault is, that they have no one on earth to take care of
them, and that they are incapable of providing for themselves. Hundreds, it is
believed, thus circumstanced, eventually have recourse to petty thefts; or, if females, they descend to practices of infamy, in order to save themselves from the
pinching assaults of cold and hunger.
Id. at 1191 n.25 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
52. See Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097–1101 (discussing Progressive ideology and its
effect on the juvenile court movement). A similar movement caused a shift in criminal
cases “from punishment as a localized practice to an enterprise that focused less on public
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component parts, the Progressives’ “Rehabilitative Ideal” had three
tenets: first, children are capable of rehabilitation; second, all that rehabilitation requires is the proper intervention; and third, the appropriate goal of rehabilitation was for “[a]ll Americans . . . to become
53
middle class Americans.” These “proper objects” of the Child Savers’ solicitous care and concern were generally understood to be poor
54
white and European immigrant youths, who were able to take advantage of an unspoken “cross-class alliance” that prioritized their
55
needs over those of black children. “North or South, the basic pattern was that upper-middle-class, native stock, urban whites would try
to reform poorer whites” to help them assimilate into American socie56
ty.
The Child Savers believed that youth misbehavior was the reflection of an “unwholesome environment, especially the baneful influ57
ence of squalid urban life,” and that the behavioral and social sci58
ences could correct misbehavior with suitable state intervention. In
other words, if the child’s undisciplined home life was the ailment,
then state intervention was the cure. Accordingly, “[c]hildren who
spectacle and more on the internalization of discipline, order, and law-abidingness.” See
Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012). In fact, the
“warden’s role was analogized to that of a parent,” and “[i]n this way, the penitentiary provided a substitute for familial discipline when the family failed.” Id. at 27–28.
53. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1137 n.76 (2003) (describing the “Rehabilitative Ideal” and
the Progressives’ views on how behavior could be changed) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54. See WARD, supra note 4, at 73 (noting that poor white and immigrant European
youths had access to “early juvenile institutions” that “reflected racial privileges”).
55. Id. at 73, 86 (stating that “[p]rior historical research stresses that poor and foreignborn white youths were a primary target of early child-saving initiatives. Most accounts
overlook how this focus disguised the way in which racial privilege was based on a shared
white or potentially white racial status, despite distinctions.”).
56. Id. at 73.
57. Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097; see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason
of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2012) (noting that “[f]or those within the
House of Refuge movement, poverty and crime were virtually synonymous”).
58. See Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1097 (explaining that “[j]uvenile misbehavior was
seen as merely the overt manifestation of underlying social pathology” and that “[w]ith
proper diagnosis and treatment . . . social pathology was considered as susceptible to cure
as physical ailments”).
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violated the law were not to be regarded as criminals but as wards of
the state who should receive nearly the same ‘care, custody, and disci59
pline’ as that given to neglected and dependent children.” Because
of the Rehabilitative Ideal, the major “criminal justice reforms [of this
period]—probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the juvenile court—-all emphasized open-ended, informal, and flexible poli60
cies” to reform offenders.
From its inception, juvenile court was more of a social welfare
61
agency than a court system. The Child Savers imagined the juvenile
court as a separate, specialized court, in which the judge would ascertain not whether the child was “guilty” or “innocent,” but “[w]hat is
he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward
62
career.” Using this information about the child’s background and
virtually unfettered discretion, the judge, acting as the parent the un63
governable child needed, would fashion an individualized sentence
64
aimed to rehabilitate the child. The entire hearing was geared towards a successful disposition in the child’s best interests.
Because the juvenile court’s aim was rehabilitation instead of
punishment, generally, the juvenile court “shun[ned] the burden65
some formalities of criminal procedures.” In many jurisdictions, the
criminal rules of evidence and procedure did not apply in juvenile
66
67
court. Hearings were confidential. Records were sealed so that sys59. Birckhead, supra note 57, at 64.
60. Feld, Constitutional Tension, supra note 22, at 1137.
61. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (describing how “[t]he child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’” and that “the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive”).
62. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909).

Judge

Mack’s article about the juvenile court is one of the most-cited law review articles published in or before 1960. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1497–98 (2012).
63. See Mack, supra note 62, at 117 (explaining that the child needed “not so much the
power, as the friendly interest of the state”); see also WARD, supra note 4, at 78 (noting that
a judge in Cook County, Illinois described the separate juvenile court as acting as a “kind
and just parent ought to treat his children”).
64. Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1099.
65. James E. Starrs, A Sense of Irony in Southern Juvenile Courts, 1 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
129, 134 (1966).
66. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (explaining that, under the views of the early reformers,
the “rules of criminal procedure were . . . altogether inapplicable” in juvenile court).
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tem-involved youths could avoid the stigma of a criminal conviction.
In most jurisdictions, children were tried by judges, and did not have
69
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
the right to trial by jury.
opined, “[w]hether the child deserves to be saved by the state is no
more a question for a jury than whether the father, if able to save it,
70
ought to save it.” The informality was “deemed a part of the rehabil71
itative process.” The state derived its power to act from the doctrine
72
of parens patriae, making the proceedings ostensibly informal, non73
adversarial and civil, instead of rigid, technical, harsh, and criminal.
The case of fourteen-year-old Thomas Majcheski, an example of
one of the “poorer whites” who needed help assimilating into Ameri74
can society and an early case in Chicago’s new juvenile court, presents a typical example of the informal procedure and rehabilitative
75
bent of juvenile court. In 1899, just a few weeks after Henry Campbell’s case, Thomas was accused of stealing grain from a freight car in
76
a railroad yard. The arresting officer told the court that Thomas’s
father was dead, that he had eight brothers and sisters, and that his
mother, a washerwoman, could not leave work to come to court. The
officer also told the court that Thomas had committed similar thefts
previously, but had never been arrested. Thomas admitted he had
stolen the grain. The judge then turned to the people in the courtroom, who may have numbered as many as 300, and asked if they had
anything to say about what should happen to Thomas. The judge was

67. ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 137–63
(1977) (describing the philosophy behind the creation of juvenile court).
68. Id.
69. Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1100–01.
70. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905).
71. Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1100.
72. Literally, “parent of the country.” For a discussion of the parens patriae doctrine
and its applicability to family court proceedings, see Jyoti Nanda, Blind Discretion: Girls of
Color and Delinquency in the Juvenile System, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1511–13 (2012).
73. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“The apparent rigidities, technicalities,
and harshness which [the early reformers] observed in both substantive and procedural
criminal law were therefore to be discarded. The idea of crime and punishment was to be
abandoned. The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”).
74. WARD, supra note 4, at 73.
75. See TANNEHAUS, supra note 1, at 26–28 (giving an account of the Majcheski case).
76. Id. at 27.
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about to incarcerate Thomas in the state reformatory, where Thomas
would “have [had] the benefit of schooling,” when a young man in
the audience stood up and told the judge that the sentence was too
harsh. Accounts indicate that the young man took up Thomas’s
cause, persuading the judge that Thomas was just trying to get food
for his family. The judge then asked the objector to take Thomas and
help Thomas become a better citizen. The young man agreed. On
the way out of the courtroom, a reporter asked the young man how
he would help Thomas reform. The young man said he was going to
“[c]lean him up and get him some clothes and then take him to my
77
mother. She’ll know what to do with him.”
The absence of procedural protections, as in Thomas Majcheski’s
case, over the years led juvenile court opponents to criticize the very
discretion that the Progressives promoted. For example, in 1927,
Herbert Lou, borrowing a phrase from Dean Pound, asserted that
“the powers of the Star Chamber were a bagatelle” compared to the
78
broad discretion afforded to juvenile courts. In 1949, Paul Tappan
impugned juvenile court practices that abrogated “the presumption
of innocence, such as the dissemination of probation reports prior to
79
adjudication.” In a 1961 law review article, Chester J. Antieau argued that children in juvenile court are entitled to the same constitutional due process safeguards that protect adults in criminal proceed80
In a 1966 law review article, James E. Starrs warned that
ings.
“[i]nformality and compassion are not necessary running mates. In
the wrong hands or in the wrong place, the Juvenile Court might
merely ‘clothe (its) naked villainy, with odd old ends stol’n of holy
81
writ, [a]nd seem a saint when most (it) play(s) the devil.’” In that
same year, the Harvard Law Review published an empirical study concluding that “the rehabilitative ideal was either fundamentally flawed
82
or imperfectly implemented.”
Despite these critiques, the idea of a separate juvenile court with
the goal of rehabilitating ungovernable youths into law-abiding citi77. Id. at 29.
78. Birckhead, supra note 57, at 65; see also Matthew Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court—
Benevolence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L.J. & CRIMINOLOGY. 464, 475 (1960) (arguing
that the informality of the juvenile court “is merely a euphemism for the star chamber”).
79. Birckhead, supra note 57, at 65–66.
80. Chester J. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387,
414–15 (1961).
81. Starrs, supra note 65, at 130 (citation omitted).
82. Birckhead, supra note 57, at 66 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).

622

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:607

83

zens proved very popular. By 1925, there was a juvenile court in all
but two states, and countries in Europe, South America, and Asia had
84
crafted laws based on the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.
B. The Experience of Black Children: An Alternate Origin Story
The treatment of black children accused of crime was vastly different. The violence against black children in the antebellum
South—convict leasing, Jim Crow juvenile justice and the racial discrimination of the houses of refuge—all combine to paint a picture
very different from that of the juvenile justice system the Child Savers
championed. Themes that dominate the history of system-involved
black children—social control, disparate expectations and inadequate
85
services—persist today. Just as importantly, examination of this history reveals how juvenile justice reform emerged as a critical symbolic
86
battleground in the struggle for civil rights, and why the Court
should have taken this struggle into account in its consideration of
whether juvenile rights would be based in Fourteenth Amendment
due process or in the Bill of Rights.

83. See Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 99 (2003) (noting that all states had established a
separate juvenile justice system, based upon the Illinois juvenile system, by 1945).
84. Birckhead, supra note 57, at 64.
85. Some important studies of the racial history of juvenile justice include: GEOFF K.
WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2012); WILEY
BRITTON SANDERS, NEGRO CHILD WELFARE IN NORTH CAROLINA (1933); ANDREW
BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND
AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE (1972); Alexander W. Pisciotta, Race, Sex and Rehabilitation: A
Study of Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Reformatory, 1825–1900, 29 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 254 (1983). For examples of histories written largely from the perspective
of the majority racial group, see generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM (1971); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE & THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF “PROGRESSIVE” JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825–1920 (1977); ROBERT M.
MENNEL, THORNS & THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825–1940
(1973); THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992).
86. See WARD, supra note 4, at 72 (“For black civic leaders in the American South, juvenile justice reform was a forward-looking venture in black community reparation and
freedom . . . . The earliest black child-savers were greatly concerned with eventually enhancing the progress of black America through equal protection of black youths in relation to rehabilitative ideals.”).
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87

1. “No use trying to reform a Negro” : Black Children in the Houses
of Refuge
Of course, when the Houses of Refuge were being built, slavery
was legal and racism was freely expressed. The Civil War was decades
away; passage of the Thirteenth Amendment was even more remote. 88
Predictably, black children accused of crime in the South faced harsh,
sometimes violent treatment, usually within slavery. But even in the
North, the belief that children were amenable to rehabilitation was
reserved for white children. In part because of the historical disregard for the slave family, for many black civic leaders it was critically
important to fulfill the promise of a juvenile court responsive to the
89
needs of black children and families.
Houses of Refuge accommodated racist attitudes towards black
children and their capabilities. For example, it was clear that New
York’s black children were not “proper objects” when the New York
House of Refuge opened its doors in 1825, because the “colored” section was not opened until 1834. And, even when the New York House
of Refuge established the “colored” section, black children were still
excluded from rehabilitation services to avoid “a waste of resources
90
and a debasement of [w]hites.” In a pattern that would be mimicked at the turn of the century with the spread of juvenile courts,
other states followed suit, opening houses of refuge and allocating

87. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE

47 (1997).

88. When the New York House of Refuge was founded in 1825, slavery was the law of
the land. Two cases are generally considered to be the Court’s most important pronouncements on the subject of slavery during the antebellum period. Both cases involved
the treatment of slaves and their children. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 608, 616–
18 (1842), the United States Supreme Court held that the federal Fugitive Slave Act preempted a Pennsylvania state law that extended procedural protections to suspected escaped slaves. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1857), the Court ruled that neither citizenship nor protection under the United States Constitution was available to African slaves and their descendants. The Court also held that Congress could not prohibit
slavery in federal territories, and that slaves could not vindicate any rights in federal court.
Id. at 449–50, 452.
89. WARD, supra note 4, at 78.
90. JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE, ADORATION
OF THE

QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC

DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 3 (2008), available at http://www.burns
institute.org/downloads/BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Question_2.pdf.
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fewer resources to black children. The superintendent of the Philadelphia House of Refuge justified excluding black children from rehabilitation programs because “[i]t would be degrading to the white
91
children to associate them with beings given up to public scorn.” In
92
Philadelphia’s House of Refuge, the “proper education” meant
teaching black boys to perform manual labor, teaching black girls to
be cooks, maids, and seamstresses, and steering all black children
93
away from academic pursuits. In places that did not have separate
black juvenile facilities, black youth were often placed in adult prisons
instead of in white juvenile facilities with white youth. For example,
in 1850, in spite of the cities’ predominantly white populations, approximately 50% of youth under fifteen in the Providence, Rhode Island, jail were black, 60% of youth at the Maryland penitentiary in
Baltimore were black, and all youth in the Washington, D.C., peniten94
tiary were black.
Houses of refuge came late to the southern states; houses of ref95
uge for southern black children came even later. In the southern
states, “[p]lantation discipline,” which included all manner of corporal and other kinds of punishment, “took care of the disobedient
96
Negro child.” Southerners simply did not think of a slave child ac97
cused of a crime “as a juvenile delinquent in need of special care;”
slaves were laborers who were taught “that theirs was a glorified place
98
among the chickens and the pigs.” When a Mississippi legislator
proposed a juvenile reform school in the late nineteenth century, as a
compromise with opponents who did not want to squander resources
on trying to rehabilitate black children because “it was no use trying
99
to reform a Negro,” he “proposed that ‘schooling and moral instruc91. MENNEL, supra note 85, at 17.
92. In 1892, the black and white Philadelphia Houses of Refuge were moved to the
Glen Mills Farm, which continues to operate as a residential home for system-involved
youths today. WARD, supra note 4, at 59; THE GLEN MILLS SCHOOLS, http://glenmills
school.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
93. WARD, supra note 4, at 56. In contrast, white boys “were trained as farmers and
skilled artisans and provided with academic instruction.” Id.
94. LEONARD P. CURRY, THE FREE BLACK IN URBAN AMERICA, 1800–1850: THE SHADOW
OF THE DREAM

115–16 (1981).

95. WARD, supra note 4, at 62.
96. MENNEL, supra note 85, at 75.
97. Id.
98. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 13.
99. WARD, supra note 4, at 82–83.
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tion’ be limited to the evenings, after ‘10 or twelve hours of work’ had
100
been performed in the fields.” The first southern house of refuge,
which opened its doors only to white boys, was built in New Orleans in
101
1847. Maryland opened the first and only southern reformatory for
black youths in 1873, almost fifty years after the New York House of
102
Even in that instance, one of the main
Refuge opened its doors.
reasons for opening the Baltimore House of Reformation for Colored
Children was “the need for agricultural labor through the state, as
103
well as the great want of competent house servants.”
There were some studies that documented the early racial inequality of juvenile courts. In 1913, the Juvenile Protective Association
of Chicago did a study of the boys in the county jail, and were “startled” to find that “[a]lthough the colored people of Chicago approximate one-fortieth of the entire population, . . . one-eighth of the boys
and young men, and nearly one-third of the girls and young women,
104
who had been confined in the jail during the year, were Negroes.”
In New York in 1925, the National Urban League did a study that revealed that “[t]o an extent evidenced by probably no other group in
the city, . . . the Negro finds himself with inadequate facilities in the
recreation field and in the field of care of dependent and delinquent
105
children.”
It should also be noted that the experiences of black youths in
houses of refuge were anomalous, because most blacks still lived in
106
the South during this time period, and where black children accused of crime faced far harsher, often violent, treatment, including
107
convict leasing, whipping, and lynching.

100. OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 47. The legislator’s bill would eventually fail. Id.
101. WARD, supra note 4, at 60.
102. Id. at 60.
103. Id. at 74. At the House of Reformation, black boys learned “how to handle the
hoe, shovel and spade; to manage horses, mules and cattle, to plow, to sow, and to reap,”
and black girls learned “to scrub, wash, and iron, to bake and cook [and] to wait upon the
family.” Id.; see also Cecile P. Frey, The House of Refuge for Colored Children, 66 J. NEGRO HIST.
10, 17–18 (1981) (noting that the Board of Managers of the House of Refuge for Colored
Children in Philadelphia desired to send the black children to a small farm in the country
so that they could learn agriculture and horticulture).
104. WARD, supra note 4, at 111.
105. Id. at 113–14.
106. Id. at 83.
107. Id. at 59, 67–68, 114–15.
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108

2. “One Dies, Get Another” : Convict Leasing and Black Youths
Convict leasing quickly emerged to fill the labor void left by the
abolition of the “peculiar institution.” Until the late 1920s and the
Great Migration, 80% of black Americans lived in the South. 109 To
satisfy the South’s acute labor need, the criminal justice system was
“retooled to provide cheap forced labor to mines, farms, timber
camps, turpentine makers, railroad builders and entrepreneurs large
and small. Tens of thousands of men, the vast majority of them black,
110
A common arrangefound themselves pulled back into slavery.”
ment might look like this: A business owner in need of labor might
“ma[k]e up a list of some eighty negroes known to both [the sheriff
and the business owner] as good husky fellows, capable of a fair day’s
work,” give that list to the local sheriff, and promise the sheriff five
111
Charges ranged
dollars plus expenses for each man he arrested.
from vagrancy, defined as not being able to prove employment, to
112
more serious crimes. Terms ranged from a year and a day for bur113
glary to life imprisonment for murder.
114
Black children were swept up in this “convict labor machine” as
easily as black adults were. In 1868, of the 222 convicts in the Louisiana penitentiary, forty-three were between the ages of ten and twenty
115
years old. By 1880, at least 25% of Mississippi’s convicts were under
116
By 1890, according to a census analysis by
the age of eighteen.
108. LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND 273 (1998); WARD, supra note 4, at 69;
MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH: 1866–1928 (1996).
109. WARD, supra note 4, at 106.
110. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 7.
111. OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 71.
112. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 7.
113. Id. at 327.
114. OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 46–48. The convict leasing system persists. As New
York Times columnist Charles M. Blow discussed in his eight-part series about how Louisiana’s private prison system thrives on high incarceration rates and harsh sentences, the
convict leasing system is alive and well. The series offered the following description of
Louisiana’s private prison system: “A prison system that leased its convicts as plantation
labor in the 1800s has come full circle and is again a nexus for profit.” Charles M. Blow,
Plantations, Prisons and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at A21; Cindy Chang, How We Built
the World’s Prison Capital, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13, 2012, at A-1.
115. WARD, supra note 4, at 67.
116. OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 46–47.
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W.E.B. Du Bois, more than 18% of all black prisoners were juve117
The rolls of a slave mine in Birmingham, Alabama, list the
niles.
death of a sixteen-year-old farmhand, sentenced to 729 days in the
118
mines for “an unrecorded theft,” just before Thanksgiving of 1910.
No black child was too young to be incarcerated. In the 1880s, the
roster at Mississippi’s infamous Parchman Farm included six-year-old
Mary Gay of Vicksburg, who was sentenced to thirty days incarceration
119
plus court costs for stealing a hat. In 1901, it housed eight-year-old
Will Evans, convicted and imprisoned for stealing some change from
120
The City of Memphis, at one
the counter of a dry goods store.
121
point, held a four-year-old black child convicted of burglary.
122
3. “The most effective way of handling delinquent Negro boys” : The
Effects of Jim Crow, Lynching, and Social Control on Black
System-Involved Youths

The juvenile court movement grew up under the watchful gaze of
Jim Crow. Accordingly, “[r]ehabilitative efforts were often reserved
for native-born and immigrant Anglo Americans in white-dominated
juvenile court communities, where common European ancestry and
white skin rendered them less threatening, distinctly ‘salvageable,’
and ultimately more assimilable—culturally, economically, and politi123
cally—than black and other nonwhite youth.”
Black children were overrepresented in juvenile court proceed124
ings, and underrepresented in rehabilitative agencies and services.
From the deep South to Chicago and New York, “white civic leaders

117. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 5. Prison conditions were brutal. A report by
journalist Ida B. Wells on the convict leasing system revealed that starvation, disease, rape
and whippings were common occurrences in prison. IDA B. WELLS ET AL., THE REASON
WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN IS NOT IN THE WORLD’S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION 23–28
(Robert W. Rydell ed., University of Illinois Press 1999) (1893).
118. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 328–29.
119. OSHINSKY, supra note 87, at 47.
120. Id. at 47–48. Evans’ crime was listed as “grand larceny.” Id.
121. Florence Kelley, A Burglar Four Years Old in the Memphis Juvenile Court, 32 SURVEY
318, 318–19 (1914); BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6.
122. WARD, supra note 4, at 115.
123. Geoff Ward, The “Other” Child Savers: Racial Politics of the Parental State, in THE
CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 225, 228 (Anthony M. Platt, Rutgers University Press 40th ed. 2009).
124. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6.
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were similarly inclined to prioritize the provision of care and limit
their influence to white youth . . . in segregated juvenile justice sys125
tems.” In the North, “this oppression typically manifested as institu126
One chief probation oftionalized neglect or subtle exploitation.”
ficer in Illinois identified “the difficulty of providing adequate care
for the dependent and neglected colored children” as “one of the
127
greatest problems with which the court has to deal.” He went on to
lay the problem at the feet of Jim Crow laws, explaining, “[t]he situation is complicated by a lack of resources in the community comparable with those available for white children in the same circumstances.
Practically no institutions are to be found in the community to which
128
this group of children may be admitted.”
In the South, the oppression of the black youth population was
129
In 1905, Arkansas governor Jeff Davis
overt and socially endorsed.
pressed for a reform school “where white boys might be taught some
useful occupation and the negro boys compelled to work and support
130
the institution while it is being done.” In 1914, Florence Kelley, director of the Chicago NAACP, sent W.E.B. Du Bois a photographic es131
say that documented the Jim Crow juvenile justice in Memphis. Kelley wrote that “[t]he city of Memphis . . . gives its white juvenile
offenders six teachers, and establishes their Juvenile Court in a beautiful building once a school house,” with separate detention rooms for
delinquent and dependent children, a gymnasium, a cottage, and a
well-equipped shop for vocational training, while black children were
afforded “a shabby six-room wooden cottage . . . badly equipped,
132
[with just] its sewer connection in the back yard” and no teacher.
Memphis’s white juvenile court judge refused to serve the black juve133
nile court.

125. WARD, supra note 4, at 228–29.
126. Id. at 105.
127. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6.
128. Id. Around the time of the passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Jim Crow was
the law of the land. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), the Supreme Court created the “separate but equal” doctrine. This doctrine would not be overturned until Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954), almost six decades later.
129. WARD, supra note 4, at 105.
130. Id. at 114.
131. Id. at 234.
132. Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. WARD, supra note 4, at 234.
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In addition to being denied their fair share of rehabilitative services, corporal punishment, in the form of whippings, was reserved
for black children. For example, 159 youths in North Carolina’s juvenile justice system were whipped in 1933; 134, or over 80%, of
134
them, were black. White North Carolina juvenile court judges professed “a widespread feeling . . . that whipping is the most effective
135
way of handling delinquent Negro boys.”
Like whippings, lynching was integral to social control in the Jim
Crow era, and black children were not exempt from this terrorization.
Well into the first half of the twentieth century, black youth were victims of extrajudicial mob executions. In 1903, just four years after the
juvenile court had come to Chicago, a mob murdered the sheriff of
Scottsboro, Alabama when he refused to turn over a black teenager
accused of “attempted criminal assault” against a nineteen-year-old
136
After the mob killed the sheriff, it moved on to the
white girl.
youth, taking him from his cell and hanging him from a telephone
137
pole. In 1908, a black teenager in Dallas, Texas, accused of raping a
138
white woman was burned to death. In 1916, seventeen-year-old Jesse Washington was lynched and burned alive by a mob in Waco, Tex139
as. In his study of black life in a Mississippi Delta town in the 1930s,
sociologist John Dollard found that the threat of lynching was ever140
present in the minds of even very young children.
134. Id. at 115.
135. Id.
136. BLACKMON, supra note 7, at 234.
137. Id. at 234.
138. Id. at 324–25.
139. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 6–7. For a detailed recounting of this tragedy,
see PATRICIA BERNSTEIN, THE FIRST WACO HORROR: THE LYNCHING OF JESSE WASHINGTON
AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP

(2006).

140. PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA 83 (2002). It should be noted that black children were also executed by the
state. One famous case involved fifteen-year-old James Lewis and sixteen-year-old Charles
Trudell, who were accused of robbery and murder of their employer, a white farmer.
WARD, supra note 4, at 118. They were convicted by an all-white jury and executed in 1947.
Id. at 119. The case triggered an international outcry against “juvenile murder” and “white
justice.” Id. Pointing out that the boys would be too short to fit the electric chair, a newspaper writer suggested that the boys be propped up on the United States Constitution, the
Bible, The Age of Reason, and The Rise of Democracy, “so that Mississippi can destroy
them all at the same time.” Id. at 120. Their federal appeals lawyer, Thurgood Marshall,
compared them to the Scottsboro Boys. Id. at 119–20.
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Around the turn of the century, black civic leaders spearheaded
their own child-saving movement. Black leaders rejected this disparate treatment, as modern ideas of childhood and the import of chil141
dren as the center of the family and hope of the next generation
“combined with black liberation agendas, informed the development
of a specific oppositional consciousness to Jim Crow juvenile jus142
The leadership was centered in the National Council of Coltice.”
ored Women’s Clubs, which installed juvenile justice reform as a high
143
These reformers
priority at its first national meeting in 1898.
worked on local levels “to establish largely voluntary self-help initia144
tives, including modest black reformatories across the South.”
Many facets of the black community were engaged in the pursuit
of getting justice for system-involved black children. For example, at
the 1920 convention of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement
Association, attendees endorsed a Declaration of Rights of the Negro
Peoples of the World, which included juvenile justice reform as a
145
Article 44 stated: “We deplore and protest
means to lift the race.
against the practice of confining juvenile prisoners in prisons with
adults, . . . and we recommend that such youthful prisoners be taught
146
The NAACP, founded
gainful trades under humane supervision.”
147
in 1909, consistently reported on juvenile justice issues in its periodical, The Crisis: A Record of the Dark Races, which sold nearly 100,000
148
copies monthly by 1919. The Crisis featured prominent stories about
a proposal for a reformatory for black children in North Carolina; the
1912 execution of Virginia Christian, a sixteen-year-old black girl convicted of murdering her employer; and the 1912 conviction, in Montgomery, Alabama, of sixteen-year-old Daisy Bell for fighting, and her
149
sentence of a year and six months on a chain gang. In each of these
instances, the newspaper offered coverage of the individual story as
141. WARD, supra note 4, at 230–31. In a 1916 issue of Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois stated that
“in the hands of dark children lies the fate of the dark world.” Id. at 231.
142. Id. at 230–31.
143. Id. at 235.
144. Id.
145. WARD, supra note 4, at 167–69.
146. Id. at 169.
147. NAACP: 100 Years of History, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history
(last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
148. WARD, supra note 4, at 173. According to historian David Levering Lewis, “[i]n
middle class [black] families” at this time, The Crisis “lay next to the bible.” Id.
149. Id. at 173–74.
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part of a larger narrative of injustice against black society.
Several
other civil rights organizations also took up the cause of juvenile justice, including the Joint Committee on Negro Child Study in New
York City, which issued a report called A Study of the Delinquent and Neglected Negro Children Before the New York City Children’s Court in 1927,
and an interracial committee in North Carolina, which conducted a
151
study of Jim Crow juvenile justice “to advance social change.”
4. “Disproportionality” Documented: The Great Migration and the
Treatment of Black Youth in Northern Courts
As the United States gained prominence as an industrial power,
cities sprinted to keep pace with the social problems attendant to rapid urban growth. The eye of the juvenile court movement was initially
centered in cities and coincided with the first wave of the “Great Migration.” During the Great Migration, thousands of blacks from the
rural South flooded Midwest, Western, and Northeast urban centers
looking for industrial jobs. The Great Migration “literally delivered
thousands of black youth and families in need to newly established juvenile court jurisdictions, where they expected greater opportunity
than was common in the South, yet still encountered exclusion on the
152
basis of race.”
Detroit provides an instructive example. Juvenile court involvement of African-American children, reflective of “a perceived lack of
family structure and the difficulty of the transition from the rural
153
South to the urban North,” was disproportionate from the earliest
years of Detroit’s juvenile court. Detroit’s juvenile court opened on
154
Detroit’s black population grew rapidly in the first
July 25, 1907.
half of the twentieth century. In 1910, Detroit’s black population was
5,000, or 1.2% of Detroit’s population. By 1920, it was 40,000, or 4%
Of Detroit’s population. Blacks made up almost 8% of the city’s pop155
ulation by 1930, 9% by 1940, 16% by 1950, and 29% by 1960. Similarly, blacks were 3.3% of Pennsylvania’s population in 1920, but

150. Id. at 173, 175.
151. Id. at 176–77.
152. WARD, supra note 4, at 230.
153. DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS: POLICING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN URBAN
AMERICA, 1890–1940, at 98 (2005).
154. Id. at 78.
155. Id. at 97.
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made up 30% of the mid-teens sent to prison, even though the of157
fense patterns for black and whites were very similar. The same patterns can be found in other cities whose demographics changed in
158
159
the Great Migration, including Chicago, New York and Washing160
ton, D.C.
Coeval with this change in the city’s racial demographics was the
growth of the city’s police force, which expanded in size and in influence, but remained predominantly white. Police officers were given
broad discretion regarding referrals to juvenile justice systems, as
their role transitioned from “community protection to crime suppres161
Subjective factors like the child’s attitude and cooperativesion.”
162
In 1926, juvenile court
ness became part of the arrest decision.
complaints against black children were filed more than twice as often
163
Although
as such complaints were filed against white children.
black children comprised only 3.3% of Detroit’s juvenile population
in 1920, they comprised 12% of youths held in custody between 1917
164
and 1928.
The phenomenon of “disproportionality” in juvenile courts was
first identified on a national scale by researcher Mary Huff Diggs in
165
the 1940s, towards the end of the Great Migration. Diggs reviewed
166
She found “that Negro chilfifty-three courts across the country.
dren are represented in a much larger proportion of the delinquency
cases than they are in the general population. . . . An appreciably
larger percent of the Negro children came in contact with the courts

156. WARD, supra note 4, at 101.
157. Id.
158. WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 118–19.
159. WARD, supra note 4, at 113.
160. WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 162–63, 166.
161. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 7; see also David B. Wolcott, “The Cop Will Get
You”: The Police and Discretionary Juvenile Justice, 1890–1940, 35 J. SOC. HIST. 349, 356–57
(2001) (“On the other hand, police departments professionalized themselves by downplaying their traditional function of maintaining public order and instead devoting their primary efforts to efficiently fighting crime.”).
162. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 7.
163. See WOLCOTT, supra note 153, at 98.
164. Id.
165. BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 8.
166. Id.
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at an earlier age than was true with the white children.” She further
found that “[c]ases of Negro boys were less frequently dismissed than
were white boys. Besides, they were committed to an institution or referred to an agency or individual much more frequently than were
168
white boys.”
II. JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
In the latter half of the twentieth century, black children were involved in the Civil Rights Movement along with adults. Just as black
leaders who were lynched or killed became powerful symbols in the
Civil Rights Movement, so too were children who were lynched or
169
killed adopted as important symbols of the fight for racial justice.
The brutal murder of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till in 1955 for whistling suggestively at a white woman on a dare captured the world’s attention because of his young age, “the innocence of his alleged offense, . . . the fact that he was a Northerner killed in the South,” and
his mother’s insistence on having an open casket at his funeral so that
170
everyone could, in her words, “see what they did to my boy.” Youth
171
also led the way in civil rights demonstrations, which spread across
172
For example, there were two such demonstrations in
the South.
Mississippi: one in 1963 in Natchez, involving over 600 black youths
173
and one in 1965 in Jackson, involving over 400 young people. In In

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See DRAY, supra note 140, at 425 (recounting the murder of Emmett Till, a young
black child, and stating that “Emmett Till’s [murder] was destined to be a very unquiet
death”).
170. See id., at 424–26 (“An estimated ten thousand people filed by the casket in the
days before Till’s funeral. . . . People thousands of miles away wept upon seeing it. [Emmett’s mother] Mamie Till Bradley herself said of the photograph’s disturbing power, ‘It
just looked as though all the hatred and all the scorn [the world] ever had for a Negro was
taken out on that child.’”).
171. See Starrs, supra note 65, at 130–31 (“It has become a commonplace phenomenon
of civil rights activity to find large numbers of children directly involved in all kinds of
demonstrations.”).
172. See id. at 133 (“Those perplexities in the use of the child demonstrator have appeared on a broad front throughout the South.”).
173. Id. at 133, 143–44. Youths in these demonstrations faced heavy penalties. Some of
the young people participating in the Natchez demonstrations were incarcerated at the
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re Burrus, the companion to the McKeiver case, black children
charged with impeding traffic as part of a demonstration protesting
school segregation asked for and were denied jury trials.
A. In re Gault and the Pyrrhic Victory of “Fundamental Fairness” over
“Fundamental Rights”
1. The Supreme Court’s “Due Process Revolution”

176

Beginning in 1961, in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement,
the “dominant theme” of the Court’s jurisprudence was racial equality. 177 The Court was not immune to the zeitgeist that characterized
this extraordinary time in the nation’s history. Far from it—in word
and deed, in civil and criminal cases, the Court disassembled the legal
178
scaffolding of American apartheid, one indignity at a time. As Professor Burt Neuborne argues,

Parchman State Penitentiary “where they were exposed to unimaginable indignities and
cruelties.” Id.
174. 167 S.E.2d 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
175. In re Burrus will be discussed in depth in Part III, infra.
176. Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative
“Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1494 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race].
177. Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1037 (1977); see also Feld, Race, supra note 176, at 1484, 1494 (discussing the Warren
Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect minority offenders” and desire to make its own
contribution to the Civil Rights Movement by “focus on procedural rights” as an answer to
the country’s profound “concern about racial inequality”).
178. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (striking down racial segregation
in prisons); Loving v. Virginia., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down laws banning interracial marriage); Brown v. Louisiana., 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) (integrating public libraries);
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1964) (outlawing racial designations on the ballot); Va. Bd. of Elections v. Hamm, 379 U.S. 19, 19 (1964) (banning separate voting and
property tax records); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (prohibiting segregated
courtrooms); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 354 (1962) (striking down segregation in airport restaurants); State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533, 533 (1959)
(striking down laws banning interracial boxing); New Orleans City Park Improvement
Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54 (1958) (outlawing segregated parks and playgrounds);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (ending racial segregation in public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama and banning laws that required blacks to ride in the back
of public buses); Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (banning segregated
public beaches).
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[the Court’s] concern over racial injustice and state institutional failure was so intense during the . . . ‘Warren years’
that it played a significant role in shaping many of the most
important constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court in
areas as diverse as federalism; separation of powers; criminal
law and procedure; freedom of speech, association, and reli179
gion; procedural due process of law; and democracy.
The Court’s concern over racial injustice is threaded throughout the
180
fabric of the Court’s decisions. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona,
Chief Justice Warren, in reference to an earlier case, “stressed the impact of private interrogation” on “an indigent Los Angeles Negro who
181
And, in Duncan v.
had dropped out of school in the sixth grade.”
182
the Court reversed an assault prosecution and benchLouisiana,
183
trial conviction that “bore hallmark indicia of Jim Crow injustice.”
As the Court would proclaim in Green v. County School Board for New
184
Kent County, the mission of the post-Brown cases was to eliminate
185
race discrimination “root and branch.”
The steady introduction into adult criminal proceedings of the
fundamental protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights was a cornerstone of what has been called the Court’s “due process revolu186
187
188
189
tion.” The protections of the federal Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and

179. Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 59, 60.
180. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
181. Cover and Aleinikoff, supra note 177, at 1037.
182. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
183. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1691–92 (2010). For an in-depth discussion of Duncan, see
Part III.A., infra.
184. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
185. Id. at 437–38.
186. Sacha M. Coupet, What To Do With the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric
and Reality About Other Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1304 n.8 (2000); see also Feld, Race, supra 176; Cover and Aleinikoff,
supra note 177, at 1035–36 (stating that “[t]he innovations of the Warren Court in the area
of criminal procedure constituted the most ambitious attempt in our constitutional history
to illuminate th[e] dark underside” of the “Dickensian netherworld of mass criminal adjudication,” describing the criminal justice system as “a world steeped in the failings of human beings and the institutions created to control them,” and “reflect[ing] the place of
the furies in the temple of Justice”).
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190

Eighth Amendments were incorporated and applied to the states by
191
way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These protections included the Sixth Amendment when the Court
192
found that “lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries,”
and extended the right to counsel to indigent adults charged with
193
felonies in the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright.
Juvenile delinquency proceedings underwent a concomitant, but
not coextensive, due process revolution. Beginning with Kent v. Unit194
ed States in 1966, the Court began to limit discretion in juvenile
court in the face of mounting evidence that the juvenile court exper195
The most far-reaching of these cases was In re
iment was a failure.
187. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule for unlawful searches and seizures to the states by way of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
188. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the government may
not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant without first
demonstrating the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (extending the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to the states).
189. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
492 (1964) (holding that suspects have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
during the pre-indictment stage “when the [criminal] process shifts from investigatory to
accusatory”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 345 (1963) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
190. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a state law that “inflict[ed] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
191. See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 557 (1998)
(“The issue in such cases was whether a particular guarantee of the Bill of Rights . . .
should be extended to state court prosecutions via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
192. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
193. Id.
194. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
195. Id. at 556; see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 77 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (recognizing that “imposing . . . rigid procedural requirements . . .
may . . . hamper enlightened development of the systems of juvenile courts”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (determining that “the constitutional safeguard of proof
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196

Gault, which granted youths in delinquency proceedings the rights
to counsel, notice, and confrontation, and the privilege against com197
Gault is commonly considered the juvepelled self-incrimination.
nile analog to Gideon, but the two cases have one very important difference. In contrast to its elevation of the “fundamental rights” as
they are enumerated in the Bill of Rights in adult criminal proceedings, the Gault Court installed Fourteenth Amendment “fundamental
fairness” as the touchstone for analysis of the minimum due process
198
Although the Court
protections required in juvenile proceedings.
declared that “whatever may be their precise impact, neither the
199
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,”
Gault reserved the Bill of Rights for adult criminal defendants.
2. Fundamental Fairness Versus Fundamental Rights
But Gideon was not the first adult criminal right-to-counsel case,
and Gault was not the first Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel
200
case. Powell v. State of Alabama was a racially charged case in which
201
three black men were accused of raping two white women. In Powell, the Court reversed the men’s capital convictions because the
Court determined that the men had not received effective assistance
202
Unlike Gideon, in which the defendant represented
of counsel.
himself, the Powell defendants had been assigned attorneys; in fact,

beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault—notice of
charges, right to counsel, the rights of confrontation and examination, and the privilege
against self-incrimination). For an in-depth discussion of these cases, see Part II.A, infra.
196. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
197. Id. at 33, 41, 55–56.
198. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that due process requirements apply to transfer
proceedings); see Gault, 387 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[P]rudence and the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment alike require that
the Court should now impose no more procedural restrictions than are imperative to assure fundamental fairness . . . .”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (holding
that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency adjudications).
199. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
200. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
201. Id. at 49.
202. Id. at 58.
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the court had assigned every attorney in the courtroom. The Court
found that the defendants were entitled to effective assistance, in the
form of counsel who would offer zealous representation instead of
204
Although Powell’s holding
merely being present in the courtroom.
provided the defendant with effective assistance of counsel in a capital
case, the Court took pains to note that the “United States by statute
and every state in the Union by express provision of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the
accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him,”
and that “[i]n most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal
205
prosecutions.” Powell is important because the Court would later extend the right to counsel as a fundamental right pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment in Gideon, despite Powell’s holding, which relied on Four206
The progression from
teenth Amendment fundamental fairness.
Powell to Gideon illustrates an instance in which the Court chose to
augment Fourteenth Amendment due process protections as a vehicle
for the provision of a critical right.
Accordingly, when the Court was confronted with the issue of extending constitutional protections to children accused of crimes, it
had two paths from which to choose. One path was grounded in
Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fairness; the other, in the protections found in the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights. In In re Gault, the Court chose the former, and consigned the
juvenile justice system to second-class status.
The Gault Court’s reasoning presaged, in key ways, application of
the Fourteenth Amendment due process balancing test that the Court
207
would announce nine years later in Mathews v. Eldridge. In Mathews,
203. See id. at 59 (noting that “the trial judge, in response to a question, said that he
had appointed all the members of the bar—for the purpose of arraigning the defendants
and then of course anticipated that the members of the bar would continue to help the
defendants if no counsel appeared”).
204. See id. at 57–58 (stating that “during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until
the beginning of their trial . . . the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real
sense” and finding the defendants “were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense”).
205. Id. at 73.
206. See id. at 60 (“The question . . . is whether the denial of the assistance of counsel
contravenes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.”).
207. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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an administrative law case that involved a due process challenge to the
adequacy of the procedures provided to claimants whose Social Security disability benefits have been terminated, the Court announced a
three-part test for considering procedural due process claims. Under
the Mathews balancing test, a court must consider the following: First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
208
would entail.
The Mathews test is squarely grounded in Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process. And although it arose in an administrative law context, the Mathews test has since been employed as “a
general approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due
209
Accordingly, this test has been applied in several
process claim.”
210
contexts, including: Santosky v. Kramer, which adopted a clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof in contested hearings for the
211
which set the
termination of parental rights; Addington v. Texas,
standard of proof required for indefinite involuntary civil commit212
ment at clear and convincing evidence; and Schall v. Martin, which
upheld the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention.
213
There is no balancing of the
But not in the criminal context.
equities for Bill of Rights protections. Explaining that “the Mathews
balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are part of the
214
criminal process,” the Court has refrained from applying the
Mathews test in criminal cases. As recently as 1992 in Medina v. Cali215
fornia, the Court reaffirmed a long line of cases that held that the
208. Id. at 335.
209. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1979).
210. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
211. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
212. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
213. The Court has applied the Mathews test in two criminal cases, United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), but in Medina states
that it is not at all clear that the Mathews test was necessary to the holdings in those cases.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
214. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443.
215. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
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application of the Due Process Clause to most criminal procedure issues is measured by the specific, usually heightened protections of the
216
relevant Bill of Rights guaranty. Or, as the Medina Court observed:
The Bill of Rights speaks in explicit terms to many aspects of
criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due
Process Clause invites undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the
217
Constitution strikes between liberty and order.
In other words, Medina demarcates a categorical distinction between the Bill-of-Rights-bound criminal procedure sector and the dueprocess-bound remainder of the legal universe. The application of
the chameleon-like balancing test is a hallmark difference between a
Bill of Rights fundamental rights analysis and a Fourteenth Amend218
The categorical approach orment fundamental fairness analysis.
dinarily results in criminal defendants enjoying greater protections
than constitutional claimants in the rest of the universe. In criminal
cases, clad in the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the
Court does not try to divine what process is due, because the Bill of
Rights prescribes it plainly enough.
The language of these two lines of reasoning, Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental fairness on the one hand and fundamental
rights as they are enumerated in the Bill of Rights on the other, is very
similar. In one, the Court used a “fundamental rights” test; in the
219
other, the Court observed the strictures of “fundamental fairness.”
In one, the Court granted that it would confer a right after finding
that it was “essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for as220
suring that fair trials are provided for all defendants;” in the other,
the Court framed the inquiry as an evaluation of whether the right
221
was one of “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”

216. Id. at 440, 442 (holding that a state statute requiring the defendant to prove her
own incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence did not contravene due process).
217. Id. at 443.
218. See Mark Sblendorio, Note, Due Process-Fundamental Fairness, 27 SETON HALL L.
REV. 735, 737–38 n.9 (1997) (“The second and distinct prong of fundamental fairness advocates that the Bill of Rights is distinct from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
220. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1967).
221. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1967).
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But the doctrinal foundations of these two lines of cases could
not be more different. Realizing “a vision of constitutional criminal
222
procedure developed by the Framers of the Bill of Rights,” the
“fundamental rights” cases were firmly anchored in rights that were
223
already “well-defined in federal prosecutions.” The practical differences perhaps might seem inconsequential; for example, whether it is
based in the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteenth, the right to counsel requires the state to provide the accused a lawyer at the government’s expense. But the doctrinal difference between the Court’s
treatment of adult criminal defendants and juvenile delinquency respondents is profound. Constitutional protections for adult criminal
defendants are affixed to the Bill of Rights, while protections for juvenile respondents seesaw on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process balancing test.
For the Gault case, the guiding principle of the Court’s due process balancing test consisted of weighing the protection afforded by a
particular due process protection against its potential for jeopardizing
224
the informality, flexibility, and efficiency of juvenile court hearings.
In other words, the due process calculus calibrated a balance between
the system’s lack of due process protections and the rehabilitative ad225
vantages of the juvenile system. The more punitive the system, the
Court reasoned, the more process it requires. Subsequent juvenile
226
cases would reaffirm this theme. But close examination of the Gault
Court’s application of its nascent Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fairness balancing test reveals a glaring shortcoming endemic to
222. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 557.
223. Id.
224. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1966) (“The problem is to ascertain the precise
impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.”).
225. See id. at 28–29 (recognizing that “[t]he traditional ideas of Juvenile Court procedure . . . contemplated that time would be available and care would be used to establish
precisely what the juvenile did and why he did it—was it a prank of adolescence or a brutal
act threatening serious consequences to himself or society unless corrected” and arguing
that “[i]f he had been over 18 . . . the Constitution of the United States would guarantee
him rights and protections with respect to arrest, search and seizure, and pretrial interrogation.”).
226. Cf. Stephan E. Oestreicher Jr., Toward Fundamental Fairness in the Kangaroo Courtroom: The Due Process Case Against Statutes Presumptively Closing Juvenile Proceedings, 11 VAND.
L. REV. 1751, 1767 (2001) (recognizing “the Court’s repeated emphasis on a juvenile’s loss
of liberty highlights the crucial role that due process plays in the juvenile context” in cases
following Gault).
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balancing tests: all the factors of the Court’s due process test are sub227
jective, unquantifiable, and difficult to prioritize.
3. In re Gault
The facts of Gault were compelling. On June 8, 1964, fifteenyear-old Gerald Gault was accused of making lewd phone calls to his
228
neighbor, arrested, and taken to a juvenile detention facility. Only
after Mrs. Gault asked Gerald’s brother to look for Gerald did his fam229
Altily learn that Gerald had been taken to the detention facility.
hough a petition was filed, neither Gerald nor his parents received a
230
The hearcopy of the petition stating the allegations against him.
231
The neighbor
ing was held the next day in the judge’s chambers.
232
who reported the allegedly lewd telephone calls was not present.
233
234
No record was made. No one
No defense attorney was present.
235
was sworn in at the hearing. The judge questioned Gerald directly,
236
After an
and then Gerald was taken back to the detention facility.
237
additional hearing, at which Gerald was again questioned by the juvenile court judge, Gerald was adjudicated delinquent and committed to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority”—in
other words, for the next six years, until he reached twenty-one years
238
old.
Handed down in the wake of Gideon, Gault stands as the Court’s
clearest pronouncement on the process due to juveniles accused of
crime. Gault extended the right to counsel to juveniles in delinquency proceedings under the Due Process Clause of the United States
227. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 944–45 (1987) (acknowledging the “serious problems in the mechanics” of balancing
tests).
228. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4, 5.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. (listing the persons present as Gault, his mother, his brother, probation officers, and the judge).
234. Id. at 5.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 5, 6.
237. Id. at 6–7.
238. Id. at 7–8.
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239

Constitution. In addition to the right to counsel, Gault also extended to youth the right to notice of the charges against them, the right
240
to confront adverse witnesses, and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
241
Gault and its progeny afagainst compelled self-incrimination.
firmed that the Fourteenth Amendment required juvenile delinquency proceedings to comport with “the essentials of due process and fair
242
treatment.”
The doctrinal foundation of the Gault decision circumscribed juvenile justice reform in the Court’s due process revolution and perpetuated racial disparity in the juvenile justice system in a number of
ways. First, Gault, more than any previous case, grounded its reasoning in a discussion of the history of juvenile court, adopting wholesale
243
The Gault opinion contains a sumthe Child Savers’ origin story.
mary of the history of juvenile court, starting with the 1899 Illinois Ju244
The opinion recounts that reformers were “apvenile Court Act.
palled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with
hardened criminals” and were “profoundly convinced that society’s
duty to the child could not be confined by the concept of justice
245
The Court ratified the animating spirit of juvenile court,
alone.”
stating that juvenile court was built upon “the highest motives and
246
most enlightened impulses.” In fact, this history omitted any recognition of the disparate treatment of youths of color during a period
when the Court’s cynosure was racial equality.
Second, although the Gault Court, by its own description, “candidly appraised” the juvenile court and lambasted the juvenile court’s
247
effectiveness, the fact that the Court stopped short of fully equating
juvenile and criminal proceedings shows that the appraisal was not
quite candid enough. The Court recognized that “[t]he absence of
substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive

239. Id. at 41.
240. Id. at 33, 56–57.
241. Id. at 55.
242. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1967).
243. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–15 (discussing the origins of the juvenile court system).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 15.
246. Id. at 17.
247. See id. at 21, 26 (suggesting that recent studies had “with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity” and effectiveness of the juvenile court system).
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careful, compassionate, individualized treatment,” but it stopped
there. The Court listed recidivism statistics that showed that the sepa249
rate juvenile system had not significantly reduced juvenile crime. It
cited sociological studies that found that “the appearance as well as
the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness—in short, the essentials of due process”—might make more of an impact on a juvenile
respondent than the “fatherly judge” and “benevolent and wise institutions of the State” conspiring “to save [the youth] from a downward
250
career.” It is likely that the numbers the Court cited, if not the studies, implicated the racial demographics of juvenile court; but if they
did, they did not do so explicitly.
Third, Gault is notable because of its Janus-faced treatment of the
Child Savers origin story. On the one hand, the Court assailed the
251
then-current juvenile system as a “kangaroo court,” and famously reiterated deep concern that youths in juvenile court were receiving
“the worst of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
252
for children.” On the other hand, despite the Court’s full-throated
rebuke, the Child Savers’ rehabilitation story remained critical to the
Court’s determination that Fourteenth Amendment fundamental
fairness, and not fundamental rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
provides enough protection for youths accused in delinquency
253
The Court rejected the idea of equivalency with criminal
court.
court, clung to the hope that the Child Savers’ original vision could
be realized, and declared that the introduction of due process rights
254
was a route to that goal.
Finally, in a preview of Mathews, the Gault Court balanced several
255
The Gault Court examfactors as it created a new juvenile court.
ined the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the child’s liberty interest
through the juvenile court’s lack of procedures used by comparing
248. Id. at 18.
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
251. Id. at 28.
252. Id. at 18 n.23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1967).
253. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 29–30 (explaining how Gault would have been afforded
more protections under constitutional due process than he was under the existing juvenile
court system).
254. Id. at 30–31.
255. Id. at 29–30.

2013]

FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS

645

what happened in Gerald’s case to what would have happened if Gerald had been an adult, to conclude that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Gerald’s liberty interest was too high without the right to
256
counsel. The Court addressed whether addition of defense counsel
and other procedural protections would derail the intimate, informal,
257
rehabilitative vision of juvenile court, to conclude that it would not.
The Court considered the administrative cost of extending each proposed protection to juvenile court, including consideration of what, if
any, ancillary protections would have to be extended to support the
258
The Court considered whether a
due process protection at issue.
particular proposed protection might remedy more than one short-

256. Id. The Court observed that if Gerald had been eighteen, and beyond the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, he would have faced a maximum punishment of a fine of $5 to $50, or
imprisonment in jail for up to two months; he would have been entitled to the full panoply
of constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, and protection against search and
seizure, and pretrial interrogation; he would have received specific notice of the charges,
and time and counsel to consider his goals for the case; and he would have had the right
to confront the complainant on the record. Id.
257. Id. at 38 n.64 (citing Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 281, 324–327 (1967)). The Court addressed this specific issue explicitly in a footnote, in which it cited a Columbia Law Review note for the proposition that “[r]ecognition
of the right to counsel involves no necessary interference with the special purposes of juvenile court procedures; indeed, it seems that counsel can play an important role in the
process of rehabilitation.” Id. The Court buttressed its position that the extension of the
right to counsel would not impede juvenile court’s rehabilitative goals by remarking that,
at the time the Court considered Gault’s case, the majority of state “court decisions, experts, . . . legislatures,” and court rules—a calculation which included at least one-third of
the states—“ha[d] demonstrated increasing recognition” of the view that youths facing
delinquency proceedings had the right to representation by retained counsel, notice of
the right, assignment of counsel, or a combination of these. Gault, 387 U.S. at 37–38
(footnotes omitted). With respect to the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
also took pains to note that the privilege against self-incrimination is “broader and deeper”
than simple exclusion of confessions that may be unreliable because they are the product
of coercion; a crucial purpose of the privilege “is to prevent the state, whether by force or
by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.” Id. at 47.
258. See id. at 30 (explaining that juvenile proceedings need not conform to all the requirements of an administrative or criminal trial, but mandating that “the essentials of due
process and fair treatment” be provided).
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259

coming of juvenile court.
And, the Court discussed whether there
was an adequate substitute for the right to counsel, to conclude that
260
All these factors tipped the Gault Court’s scale in
there was none.
favor of extending the right to counsel pursuant to the Fourteenth
261
Amendment.
Had the Court jettisoned the Child Savers’ origin story, it might
have determined that juvenile delinquency proceedings were completely analogous to criminal trials, and applied to juvenile delinquency proceedings the same constitutional protections that check
the government’s power in criminal proceedings. Instead, the Court
262
set out to map the “gossamer” contours of due process using the
amorphous principle of Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fair263
The Court’s goal was to import due process
ness as its compass.
standards, so that the states would not have “to abandon or displace
264
any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process,” like confi265
In this way, the Fourteenth
dentiality and rehabilitative services.
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing test broke new ground,
as a hybrid, quasi-criminal juvenile justice system sprang, fully formed,

259. See id. at 29–30 (implying that Gault’s trial might have gone differently had due
process been observed, since many aspects—like the right to notice and the right to confront witnesses—would have come into play).
260. Id. at 36 (stating “[t]he probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His
role . . . is as arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the judge represent
the child.”).
261. Id. at 41.
262. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 602 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., joining in reversal of
judgment).
263. Gault, 387 U.S. at 19–20.
264. Id. at 21.
265. Id. at 25 (“[T]here is no reason why, consistently with due process, a State cannot
continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provision for the confidentiality of records of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles.”); see also id. at
27–28 (noting that given the deprivation of liberty at stake in a juvenile delinquency trial,
“our Constitution . . . require[s] the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied
in the phrase ‘due process,’” but such injection of “due process requirements [to] introduce a degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings [and] some elements
of the adversary system [does not] require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge
be replaced by its opposite”).
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from the Court’s collective faith in the unrealized promise of the
266
Child Savers’ origin story.
III. MCKEIVER V. PENNSYLVANIA: THE RESULT OF GAULT’S MISSTEP
In Gault, the Court reached the same result as it had in Gideon by
a divergent doctrinal path. The Court’s jury-trial-right jurisprudence
provides an example of an instance in which fundamental fairness
and fundamental rights led to different outcomes. In 1968, in Duncan
267
v. Louisiana, the Court held that state criminal defendants charged
with felonies had a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment,
268
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In stark
contrast, consideration of the jury trial question stopped the momentum of the juvenile procedural due process revolution in its tracks. In
1971, hewing faithfully to the Child Savers’ rehabilitative vision, the
269
Court held, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, that juveniles facing delinquency proceedings do not have a federal constitutional right to a ju270
In this
ry trial under either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.
way, the two jury cases that the Court considered during this time illuminate the Court’s jurisprudential misstep.
A. Duncan v. Louisiana
On May 20, 1968, a year after the Gault decision and just five
months before the protests of appellants in In re Burrus, McKeiver’s
companion case, the Court swept the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial into its revolution. In Duncan, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury in serious criminal prosecutions was
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
271
Amendment and applied to the states.
Nineteen-year-old Gary Duncan was charged with simple battery,
a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum penalty of two years’ im-

266. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 559 (“[T]he Gault Court cast itself
loose of the Constitutional Framers’ vision of a code of criminal procedure and assumed
the task of identifying the core components of a fundamentally just system of criminal
prosecutions of youth.”).
267. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
268. Id. at 149.
269. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
270. Id. at 553.
271. Id. at 157–58.
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272

prisonment and a fine of $300. The incident “bore hallmark indicia
273
Driving along Highway 23 in Plaquemines
of Jim Crow injustice.”
Parish, Duncan, who was black, saw two of his cousins involved in a
274
“conversation by the side of the road with four white boys” and
feared the worst because his cousins had told him about racial incidents at the all-white high school to which they had recently trans275
ferred. While the trial testimony that Duncan encouraged his cousins to “break off the encounter and enter his car” was uncontested,
276
the facts of the assault were in dispute. The white witnesses testified
that Duncan slapped the complainant, Herman Landry, on the elbow
just before Duncan got back in his car, while the black witnesses testi277
fied that Duncan just touched Landry’s elbow. Duncan’s timely request for a jury trial was denied because the Louisiana constitution allowed for jury trials only in cases where capital punishment or
278
Duncan was conimprisonment at hard labor could be imposed.
279
victed and sentenced to sixty days in jail and a fine of $150.
The Court applied the fundamental rights test and concluded
that a jury trial is indeed a fundamental right, “essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided

272. Id. at 146–47.
273. See Bowers, supra note 183, at 1692. The opinion in Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392
(E.D. La. 1968) provides additional context. The Sobol opinion details the retaliatory prosecution of Gary Duncan’s trial lawyer, Dick Sobol, by Leander Perez, Jr., the Plaquemines
Parish District Attorney. Sobol, 289 F. Supp. at 393. Sobol was accused of practicing law
without a license. Id. The court stated:
The circumstances surrounding the arrest and charge against Sobol, and the
course of the Duncan case, convince us that Sobol was prosecuted only because
he was a civil rights lawyer forcefully representing a Negro in a case growing out
of the desegregation of the Plaquemines Parish school system. The attitude in
this parish toward realization by Negroes of their civil rights is well known to this
court. . . . District Attorney Leander Perez, Jr., stated publicly in 1965 that, if any
known agitator were to appear in Plaquemines Parish, his mere presence would
amount to a disturbance of the peace, since he was an outsider.
Id. at 401.
274. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 146.
279. Id.
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280

for all defendants,” as “the common-sense judgment of a jury” is
substituted for “the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reac281
tion of the single judge.” Even though it was clear that Duncan was
guilty of at least simple battery, since both sides agreed that Landry
282
was the victim of an unwanted touching, the Court opined that a jury may have offered better protection against the “unfounded crimi283
nal charges.” Relying on then-current social science research on ju284
rors as fact finders, the Court tempered its acknowledgement of the
government’s argument that trained professionals might do a better
285
job of applying law to facts and make more accurate factual findings
with the observation that “when juries differ with the result at which
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which
286
they are now employed.” As in Gault, the Court discussed the appli287
cable history, in this case, the history of the jury trial right. But there
was no measured consideration of whether adding juries might remedy any perceived shortcomings of state criminal proceedings, of
288
whether bench trials are an adequate substitute for jury trials, or

280. Id. at 157–58.
281. Id. at 156.
282. Id. at 146 n.1, 147 (defining simple battery as “battery, without the consent of the
victim, committed without a dangerous weapon” and stating that “appellant slapped Herman Landry, one of the white boys, on the elbow” (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:35
(1950))); see also State v. J.L., 945 So.2d 884, 889 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a nonconsensual touching established the “essential elements of simple battery . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt”).
283. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
284. Id. at 157.
285. Bowers, supra note 183, at 1692; see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157 (acknowledging criticisms “as to the wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and
criminal proceedings”).
286. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157.
287. Id. at 151–54.
288. The Court does make cursory note that:
[T]he fact is that in most places more trials for serious crimes are to juries than
to a court alone; a great many defendants prefer the judgment of a jury to that of
a court. Even where defendants are satisfied with bench trials, the right to a jury
trial very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial
unfairness less likely.
Id. at 158.
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even of the administrative costs of jury trials. Because the Court’s extension of the jury trial right was based in the Sixth Amendment,
289
there did not have to be.
B. DeBacker v. Brainard: Setting the Stage for McKeiver
DeBacker v. Brainard 290 provided the most insight the Court would
give on the juvenile jury trial right until McKeiver. DeBacker presented
the two issues that the Court would later take up in McKeiver and In re
291
Winship : whether juveniles facing delinquency proceedings are enti292
tled to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and to adjudication under the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
293
standard.
Seventeen-year-old Clarence DeBacker was charged with forgery
294
295
of a bank check. At trial, he moved, unsuccessfully, for a jury trial.
296
He was convicted at trial by the county judge.
DeBacker’s juvenile court hearing was held March 28, 1968—
297
seven weeks prior to the Court’s ruling in Duncan. That seven weeks
made the difference between considering and sidestepping the merits: the Court determined that, since DeBacker’s trial occurred seven
weeks before the Duncan decision was handed down and because of
298
anti-retroactivity doctrine, DeBacker’s case did not properly present

289. See id. at 149 (finding the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to be
fundamental).
290. 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
291. 397 U.S. 358.
292. Id. at 30.
293. Id. at 31.
294. DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508, 509 (Neb. 1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S.
28 (1969).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. DeBacker, 396 U.S. at 30.
298. For a discussion of retroactivity doctrine, see Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of
Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should
Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (“[R]etroactivity avoids the unfairness inevitably attendant to non-retroactive application of judicial decisions, ensuring that similarly situated
litigants are treated equally.”).
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the issue of whether juveniles facing delinquency proceedings are en299
titled to jury trials.
Besides the fact that it was a precursor for McKeiver, DeBacker is
notable for its dissents. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in a
300
rights-based opinion. Justice Black made his intentions plain: “I can
see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of [the due process rights extended in Gault] and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is
surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the Eng301
He continued, foreshadowing what would
lish-speaking world.”
emerge as the central tension identified two years later in McKeiver:
“[t]he balancing of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceeding with the due process requirement of a jury trial is a matter for a
302
future Constitutional Convention,” for “[w]here there is a criminal
trial charging a criminal offense, whether in conventional terms or in
the language of delinquency, all of the procedural requirements of
303
the Constitution and Bill of Rights come into play.”
Save the rights to “a speedy and public trial” and to a jury trial, by
the time the Court considered McKeiver, juveniles enjoyed all the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, by the time the Court
considered McKeiver, the Court had decided one of the two DeBacker
issues—the accused’s right to have each element proven beyond a
reasonable doubt—in In re Winship, deciding in favor of granting ju304
veniles more due process protection.

299. DeBacker, 396 U.S. at 30. The Court also passed on the question of whether the
preponderance of the evidence standard was properly applied to juvenile proceedings,
ruling that this case was not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of
proof the government must meet for juvenile delinquency adjudications because the issue
had been effectively waived by juvenile defense counsel. Id. at 31. Juvenile defense counsel had neither objected to the lower court’s application of the preponderance of the evidence standard, nor moved the lower court for application of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. Id. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel even went so far
as to concede the point, admitting that “even under a reasonable doubt standard” the government’s evidence would have been “sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id.
300. Id. at 33 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 34 (Black, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 38.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 368 (holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof was
required in juvenile cases).
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C. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
The Court’s three major juvenile rights decisions prior to McKeiver—Kent v. United States, In re Gault, and In re Winship—had established
fundamental fairness as the touchstone for Fourteenth Amendment
analysis of the minimum due process protections required in juvenile
305
proceedings. This line of cases affirmed that due process required
juvenile delinquency proceedings to comport with “the essentials of
306
But, coming as it did during the
due process and fair treatment.”
Civil Rights Movement and featuring a challenge to the absence of
the right to a public trial by jury for black children protesting school
307
segregation, McKeiver also fell squarely in the heart of the Supreme
Court’s due process revolution. Accordingly, McKeiver sat uneasily at
the intersection of fundamental fairness and fundamental rights.
McKeiver was a consolidation of two sets of cases, one set from
308
309
Pennsylvania and the other from North Carolina. The Pennsylva310
nia cases presented typical juvenile delinquency matters. The North

305. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (holding that due process requirements apply to transfer
proceedings); Gault, 387 U.S. at 29–30 (holding that juveniles have right to notice of
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confrontation
and cross-examination in adjudicatory hearings in delinquency cases); Winship, 397 U.S. at
368 (holding that fundamental fairness requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency adjudications).
306. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
307. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 536–37.
308. Id. at 535.
309. Id. at 538.
310. Id. at 534–35. The Pennsylvania cases arose from the appeals of two boys, sixteenyear-old Joseph McKeiver and fifteen-year-old Edward Terry. Id. at 534–35. The allegations against McKeiver were that, as part of a group of twenty or thirty other youths, he
chased three young teenagers and took twenty-five cents from them. Id. at 536. McKeiver
was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. Id. at 534. The allegations
against Terry were that he hit a police officer with his fists and with a stick when the officer
broke up a fight that he and other youths were watching. Id. at 536. Terry was charged
with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy. Id. at 535. At their respective
trials, the boys’ attorneys moved for, but were denied, jury trials. Id. Both boys were convicted after bench trials, even though, at the close of McKeiver’s bench trial, the court described the evidence against him as “weak,” and noted that McKeiver had a steady job and
that this case was his first involvement with the juvenile justice system. Id. at 535–36.
It is worth discussing how extremely weak the evidence in McKeiver’s case was.
McKeiver was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving stolen goods in a juvenile de-
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Carolina facts presented a very different scenario. In In re Burrus,
one of the North Carolina cases, Barbara Burrus and approximately
forty-five other black schoolchildren, ranging in age between eleven
and fifteen years old, were charged in juvenile court with willfully im312
The allegations were that the children interfered
peding traffic.
with traffic as they participated in a demonstration protesting school
313
assignments and a school consolidation plan in Hyde County. The
demonstrators believed that the Hyde County “school system unlaw314
The lower court
fully discriminated against black schoolchildren.”
found that, “on various occasions the juveniles . . . were observed
walking along Highway 64 singing, shouting, clapping, and playing
315
At trial, a lone highway patrolman testified that the
basketball.”
children refused to leave the paved portion of the highway when
316
The cases were consolidated into groups, and James E. Ferasked.
guson, II, a prominent civil rights attorney in North Carolina and a
cooperating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education

linquency petition. Id. at 534–35. Two alleged victims testified at trial. Id. at 536. One
testified he was robbed by a gang, while the other testified that he was robbed by a lone
thief. In re Edward Terry, 265 A.2d 350, 351 n.1 (Pa. 1970). One testified that he rode a
bicycle away from the robbery, and was riding one when arrested, while the other testified
that he identified the robber by his distinctive walk. Id. Both testified that the robber was
not wearing glasses, but McKeiver had worn them since childhood. Id.
311. 167 S.E.2d 454, (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
312. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 536.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 556.
315. Id. at 537. The racism of the lower court is all too apparent. As the court related
the underlying facts:
All of the cases stem from what may be classified as a concerted demonstration by Negroes of Hyde County to assert their definance [sic] of law and order
and to disrupt the normal economic and social life of Hyde County by a wilful,
intentional and flagrant disregard and violation of laws duly enacted by the governing bodies of the State for the public welfare and orderly conduct of human
affairs for all citizens of the State.
Burrus, 167 S.E.2d at 457. The court’s overt discussion of “defiance,” “disrupt[ion],” and
“wilful, intentional and flagrant disregard” by the “Negroes of Hyde County” reveals how
completely the state appellate court’s view of the evidence and the case were shaped by
racism.
316. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537.

654

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
317

[Vol. 72:607

318

Fund, represented all of the children.
In each case, counsel objected to the exclusion of the general public and requested a jury tri319
320
al. In each case, the general public was excluded, and the request
321
Each of the children was found delinfor a jury trial was denied.
322
Each
quent, and placed on probation for either one or two years.
child was ordered to comply with the conditions of probation, which
323
included not violating any North Carolina laws.
There is a direct connection between the McKeiver litigation and
the African-American community’s early-twentieth-century concerns
about the racially disparate treatment of black juveniles as compared
to their white counterparts. In re Burrus was a NAACP Legal Defense
Fund (“LDF”) case, brought under the auspices of LDF’s National Of324
fice for the Rights of the Indigent (“NORI”) Project. A comparison
325
between the petitioner’s briefs in McKeiver and Burrus reveal that
the LDF saw Burrus and the possibility of importing jury trials into juvenile delinquency court as an avenue to prevent African-American
children from receiving disparate and oppressive treatment by the ju326
While the McKeiver brief did not develop the racial
venile courts.
dimension of the issue, the LDF brief in Burrus paid careful attention
to it. For example, the Burrus brief specifically noted that African-

317. See generally, James E. Ferguson, II, FERGUSON CHAMBERS & SUMPTER, P.A.,
http://fergusonstein.com/attorneys.php?attorneyId=3 (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (providing more information about James Ferguson II).
318. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 530.
319. Id. at 537.
320. While the “public trial” right of the Sixth Amendment is beyond the scope of this
Article, examination of that right in juvenile trials might raise similar questions.
321. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 537.
322. Id. at 537–38.
323. Id. at 538.
324. For a brief description of NORI and its background, see JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 430–60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWYER 156–58 (2006).
325. See Brief for Petitioners, In re Burrus, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (No. 128), 1970 WL
121988 [hereinafter Burrus Brief]; Brief for Petitioners, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971) (No. 322), 1970 WL 136804 [hereinafter McKeiver Brief].
326. See Burrus Brief, supra note 325, at 10 (“A jury trial can play an important role to
protect youth against the commonly observed abuses of the enormous discretion granted
those administering juvenile courts—a discretion which often has been employed to the
detriment of racially . . . disadvantaged groups.”).
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American children were particularly vulnerable to unjust and unequal
327
treatment in juvenile court, and it named the protection of jury trial
328
The Court’s near-total refusal to
as a safeguard against this.
acknowledge the significance of the disparity in the juvenile court’s
treatment of black youths is all the more striking in light of the LDF’s
explicit and repeated invocation of the issue.
The McKeiver opinion is a plurality, authored by Justice
Blackmun, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
329
Stewart. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment and filed a sepa330
Justice White also concurred and filed a separate
rate opinion.
331
opinion. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Marshall, dis332
Focusing on the issue of the provision of a public trial or
sented.
327. Burrus Brief, supra note 325, at 23–24.
328. Id. at 10, 24, 32.
329. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 530.
330. Id. at 557. Justice Harlan’s concurrence provided a fifth vote for the plurality’s
ruling, “on a ground that was both narrower in its implications for juvenile law and much
broader in its implications for criminal procedure.” Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191,
at 561 n.35. Justice Harlan, steadfast in his conviction that Duncan v. Louisiana wrongly
extended the right to trial by jury to state proceedings, asserted that due process did not
require jury trials in either criminal or delinquency trials. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring). It is notable, however, that Justice Harlan explained that if he were to
accept Duncan as good law, then he “d[id] not see why, given Duncan, juveniles as well as
adults would not be constitutionally entitled to jury trials, so long as juvenile delinquency
systems are not restructured to fit their original purpose.” Id.
331. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551–53 (White, J., concurring). Justice White agreed that
juries were not constitutionally required in delinquency proceedings. Id. at 551. Justice
White based his ruling on the fact that the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court stems
from the important distinction between “blameworthy” adult criminals, and juvenile offenders whose acts were “not deemed the consequence of mature and malevolent choice
but of environmental pressures (or lack of them) or of other forces beyond their control.”
Id. at 552. To Justice White, the “deterministic assumptions” of the juvenile justice system
meant that the system did not “stigmatize the juvenile delinquent by branding him a criminal; his conduct is not deemed so blameworthy that punishment is required to deter him
or others.” Id. at 551–52. He also based his ruling on his understanding that “the consequences of adjudication [in juvenile court were] less severe than those flowing from verdicts of criminal guilt,” and that the primary objective of the juvenile justice system was
treatment, not punishment, of children. Id. at 552–53.
332. Id. at 557–72 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas’s dissent argued that because the distinction between “delinquent” juvenile proceedings and “criminal” adult proceedings was meaningless, Duncan established a right to a jury trial for “any person,” not
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trial by jury, Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment concerning
the Pennsylvania cases, but dissented from the plurality’s judgment
333
for the North Carolina cases.
1. Plurality by Justice Blackmun
Justice Blackmun expressly declined to reach for the most facile
answer to the question—that the “civil” label applied to juvenile court
proceedings meant that Duncan, which extended the jury trial right to
“criminal” cases, was not controlling—with the qualification that “the
334
Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach.” Instead, he set
out to apply the amorphous due process standard that the Court used
in Kent and Gault, setting the Court’s task as “ascertain[ing] the pre335
cise impact of the due process requirement,” with Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental fairness balancing and what would later
become its traditional considerations, such as the importance of the
interest at stake, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
because of the procedures used, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, whether there is an adequate substitute for the
336
requirement, and costs and other administrative concerns, as a
guide.
The plurality’s analysis incorporates many considerations that
could not be taken into account in a fundamental rights analysis. For
example, just as the Gault majority considered whether there was an
337
adequate substitute for the right to counsel, the McKeiver plurality

“any adult person . . . .” Id. at 560. The dissenters answered the argument that juvenile
dispositions are not as serious as adult sentences with the observation that, in the North
Carolina cases, the youngest child faced imprisonment of up to ten years, and all of the
children faced imprisonment of up to five years. Id. at 557–59. Because it is clear that an
adult facing imprisonment for that long would have been entitled to a jury trial, the dissent argued, it is clear that that right should have been extended to the juveniles in the
instant case. Id. at 560.
333. Id. at 553–57.
334. Id. at 540–41 (majority opinion).
335. Id. at 541.
336. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting out the factors to be
considered in a due process analysis).
337. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (finding the probation officer and the judge
inadequate substitutes for counsel).
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considered whether there was an adequate substitute for juries.
Reasoning that juries are not required in several types of cases, including equity, worker’s compensation, probate, or deportation cases, Justice Blackmun summarily concluded that the jury is not “a necessary
339
The plurality expressed its
component of accurate factfinding.”
unqualified endorsement of the adequacy of judicial factfinding without support. The plurality also dismissed out of hand the appellants’
concerns about the unfairness of: “the inapplicability of exclusionary
and other rules of evidence;” “the juvenile court judge’s possible
awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and . . . the contents of the
social file;” and “repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses
in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social work340
The plurality even went so far as to intimate that raising the
ers.”
specter of unfairness flouted “every aspect of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system
341
contemplates.”
Justice Blackmun further acknowledged that the reality of juvenile court fell far short of its ideal, enumerating a litany of the juvenile justice system’s profound shortcomings, including a dearth of
professional help and resources; a surfeit of apathy and an “unwillingness to . . . be concerned” from the community; and a paucity of
342
Far from the white-coated experts the
dispositional alternatives.
343
Court described in In re Winship, the grim reality was that, at the
time that McKeiver was decided, half of juvenile court judges—the very
factfinders whose skills were at issue in McKeiver—had not received
undergraduate degrees, and a fifth had received no college education
338. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541–42 (outlining Pennsylvania and North Carolina’s arguments that jury trials were not necessary in juvenile proceedings, given the other safeguards in place).
339. Id. at 543. Paul Bator has written what is arguably the seminal article on what
“truth” or “accuracy” mean in criminal proceedings. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1963). In a
nutshell, the argument is that there is no “truth” in criminal proceedings, only process. Id.
The old adage that 100 guilty people should go free before convicting one innocent person is of course a great example.
340. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 544.
343. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the
essential purposes behind juvenile courts included rehabilitation, avoiding stigmatization,
and overly burdensome procedural requirements).
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344

at all. But, even in the face of “all these disappointments, all these
failures, and all these shortcomings,” the plurality concluded that the
system was not so damaged as to require the Court to jettison the ide345
al of the informal, rehabilitative juvenile justice system altogether.
The plurality opinion detailed misgivings about the formality that
attends jury trials and how that formality might interrupt the intimate,
individualized, rehabilitative—and aspirational—vision of juvenile
346
It noted that jury trials might remake juvenile court into a
court.
347
“fully adversary process.” It also lodged an administrative objection,
not available in a substantive due process analysis, predicting that extending jury trials to juvenile proceedings “would bring with it into
that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
348
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial.”
Just as important, however, is what the plurality failed to consider. The plurality was silent on the racial failings of the juvenile system. While the Court catalogued the juvenile court’s many deficiencies, it did so without consideration that the Child Savers’ ideal itself
might have been corrupt, to the extent that it was a white ideal not
349
Confronting that reality might
meant to apply to youth of color.
have made the Court choose a rights-based analysis rather than a fairness-based analysis, as it had in so many other cases.
2. Justice Brennan and the Right to a Public Trial
Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent350
Justice Brennan agreed that juvenile proceedings do
ing in part.
not constitute criminal proceedings under the aegis of the Sixth
351
Amendment. The issues that most concerned Justice Brennan were
(1) the reasons the jury process is needed, and (2) whether there is
352
With respect to the first isan adequate substitute for the process.
sue, Justice Brennan considered “whether [the] jury trial is among the

344. Id. at 544 n.4.
345. Id. at 545.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 550.
349. See supra Part II.B.1.
350. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553.
351. Id. at 553.
352. Id. at 553–57.
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353

‘essentials of due process and fair treatment.’”
In a quintessential
fundamental fairness analysis that makes room for a substitute for a
fundamental right, he concluded that the right to a jury trial was not
such a right, so long as the state’s procedure “protect[s] the juvenile
from oppression by the Government” and the “compliant, biased, or
354
He found that a public trial grants protection
eccentric judge.”
against “possible oppression by what is in essence an appeal to the
355
community conscience” as much as a jury does, and so concluded
that a juvenile’s jury trial depended on whether that juvenile was af356
forded the right to a public trial.
Justice Brennan’s concurrence diverged from the rationale of the
plurality, by considering the advantages of a jury beyond its role as
simple fact finder in his analysis of whether there is an adequate sub357
stitute for a jury trial. Accordingly, Justice Brennan concurred with
the judgment as to the Pennsylvania case (as Pennsylvania law at that
time could be read to afford juveniles the right to a public trial), and
dissented with the judgment as to the North Carolina case (because
358
North Carolina required closed proceedings).
The difference between the plurality’s understanding of the jury’s role and Justice Brennan’s conceptualization of the jury’s role is
of particular moment. The plurality reduced the role of the jury to
359
that of a mere factfinder, and ignored the jury’s critical function as
a representation of the community’s conscience, which the Court elevated in Duncan when it stated that “when juries differ with the result
at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are
serving some of the very purposes for which they were created and for
360
which they are now employed.”
McKeiver resulted because the Court did not go far enough in
Gault, and Duncan, the adult criminal analog to McKeiver, brings this
failure into stark relief. Had the Court based youths’ due process

353. Id. at 553 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)).
354. Id. at 554–55.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 555.
357. See id. at 555–56 (discussing how public trials could serve the same functions as
jury trials, including protecting against “misuse of the judicial process”).
358. Id. at 554–57.
359. Id. at 543.
360. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
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rights in the Bill of Rights and not in Fourteenth Amendment fundamental fairness, McKeiver would have had a very different result.
IV. THE WORLD THAT GAULT MADE: CURRENT JUVENILE COURT AND
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT
A. Disproportionate Minority Contact
The Supreme Court’s embrace of fundamental fairness as the basis of juvenile procedural protections rather than fundamental rights,
coupled with the long history of racialized treatment of black children, exacerbated disparate treatment of children of color in the juvenile justice system.
The data are shocking and familiar. A grossly disproportionate
361
majority of youth in the juvenile justice system are children of color.
362
In 2008, juvenile courts handled 1.7 million delinquency cases. The
Department of Justice reported that in 2008, although children of
color comprised only 22% of the country’s youth population, and although rates of commission of crime were static across racial groups,
children of color accounted for at least 54% of arrests for violent
363
crime, and 36% of arrests for property crimes. Black youth, at only
16% of the population, were most overrepresented in juvenile ar364
Between 2002 and 2004, for example, African Americans
rests.
361. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 11, at 1; see also JEFF
ARMOUR & SARAH HAMMOND, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MINORITY
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM 4 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/
minoritiesinjj.pdf (stating that “[m]inority juveniles are confined and sentenced for longer
periods and are less likely to receive alternative sentences or probation compared to white
juveniles”).
362. CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DELINQUENCY CASES IN
JUVENILE COURT, 2008, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf.
363. Id. In 2008, the population of children in the United States between the ages of
ten to seventeen was 78% white, 16% black, 5% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 1% American
Indian. Id.
364. CHARLES

PUZZANCHERA,

OFFICE

OF

JUVENILE

JUSTICE

&

DELINQUENCY

PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 9
(2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf. For violent crime
arrests, 47% involved white and Latino youth, 52% involved black youth, 1% involved
Asian youth, and 1% involved American Indian youth. Id. For property crime arrests, the
proportions were 65% white and Latino youth, 33% black youth, 2% Asian youth, and 1%
American Indian youth. Id.
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comprised 28% of juvenile arrests, 30% of court referrals, 37% of detained youth, 38% of youth placed out of their home, 34% of youth
365
waived to adult court, and 58% of youth locked in adult prisons. An
African-American boy is nine times more likely to be detained for a
366
drug offense as a white boy charged with the exact same offense.
An African-American boy has a one-in-three chance of being sent to
367
prison.
The disparate treatment only begins at arrest. Youth of color are
disproportionately represented and receive worse outcomes compared to their white counterparts at every decision-making point in
368
And, it is widely acknowledged that
the juvenile justice system.
overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system
cannot be explained by rates of offending, which are static across ra369
cial and ethnic groups; arrest rates, which hover near an all-time
370
low; or demographics, as disproportionate minority contact exists in
nearly every state—even states with very small populations of people
371
of color. It is also widely acknowledged that the possible causes in372
clude conscious or unconscious racial bias in combination with the
enormous discretion that the juvenile justice system affords its actors.

365. Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 360
(2011).
366. W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE FAIRNESS AND EQUITY,
DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT/CONTACT (DMC) FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/downloads/FACT%20SHEET%20BI.doc (last visited Mar.
13, 2013).
367. Id.; ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE FACT SHEET: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT
(DMC), available at http://www.cclp.org/documents/JJDPA/DMC_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
368. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 11; ARMOUR &
HAMMOND, supra note 361.
369. See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 2 (reporting the trends of delinquency
cases in juvenile court).
370. Id. at 1.
371. See BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 2, 8, 10 (explaining that children of color
“comprise 35 percent of the total U.S. youth population, yet make up 65 percent of all
youth who are securely detained pre-adjudication”).
372. Geoff Ward et al., Racial Politics of Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker
Orientations Toward Disproportionate Minority Confinement, 1 RACE & JUSTICE 154, 158–59, 175
(2011); see also BELL & RIDOLFI, supra note 90, at 10 (explaining that thirty-two of forty-four
states found “evidence of ethnic or racial differences in juvenile justice system decisionmaking that was unaccounted for by differential criminal activity”).
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This phenomenon, the overrepresentation and disparate treatment of children of color in the juvenile justice system, has been
named disproportionate minority contact (“DMC”), and has been ex373
tensively documented in every state.
B. Modern-Day Juvenile Court Practice
The history of the treatment of black system-involved children
begins to give these numbers dimension; the Court’s misstep in Gault
completes the explanation. Chronicling the life of a typical juvenile
case illuminates how the current juvenile justice system, ostensibly
race-neutral, allows system actor discretion and its consequence, disparate treatment of youth of color, to flourish in juvenile proceed374
The legal process that contributes to this overrepresentation
ings.
can be laid at the feet of the Gault decision.
1. Citation or Arrest
A juvenile case usually starts with an encounter with the police. 375
In 2009, 83% of cases referred to juvenile court came from law en376
Black youth, at only 16% of the population,
forcement agencies.
377
were most overrepresented in juvenile arrests. At arrest, the police
officer, who most often does not live in the child’s neighborhood, has
broad discretion to determine the direction the child’s case will
378
On one end of the spectrum of police intervention, the oftake.
ficer can choose to divert the arrest, allowing the youth to avoid juve373. See ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 367, at 1 (explaining that the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act requires States to “address” DMC within the juvenile
justice system and jurisdictions need to “approach this work with focused, informed, and
data-driven strategies”).
374. See infra Parts IV.B.1–2.
375. See Birckhead, supra note 57, at 70–80 for a comprehensive discussion of the most
common points of entry into juvenile delinquency court—the child welfare and status offender systems, public schools, retail stores, and neighborhood police presence.
376. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: CASE FLOW DIAGRAM, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/
ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
377. See supra text accompanying note 364.
378. Cf. SARAH LIVSEY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE’S DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY PROBATION CASELOAD, 2007, at 1 (2010),

available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230170.pdf (“Probation supervision was
the most severe disposition in 34% (561,600) of all delinquency cases.”).
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379

nile court altogether. The officer might decide to counsel the child
and release him, simply return him to his parents, or offer the child
380
Of the 1.7 million delinthe option of some voluntary sanction.
quency cases in 2008, 423,400 cases, or 25%, were addressed informally, with the youth agreeing to a community-based sanction like performing community service, paying restitution, writing a letter of
apology, or taking a class aimed at deterring the child from commit381
On the other end of the
ting the specific offense in the future.
spectrum, the officer might choose to arrest the child and detain him
until his initial court appearance, where a judge will decide where the
382
child will be placed pending trial.
The opportunities for discretion between these two points are
limitless. For example, almost 70% of juvenile arrests are referred to
383
juvenile court. But a case can be referred through a formal arrest,
after which the officer might release the child with a date to appear in
court, or through a ticket or citation, after which the officer might re384
lease the child with a court date. The officer often makes this critical, early-stage determination after talking to the complaining witness,
the youth, and the youth’s parents, evaluating the demeanor and reaction of the youth and of the youth’s parents, and reviewing the
youth’s prior contacts with the juvenile justice and child welfare sys385
tems.
In addition to the initial decision about diversion or referral, the
officer also makes a recommendation as to what the child’s charges
should be. The vast majority of juvenile referrals involve minor
crimes, like disorderly conduct, disturbing the peace, minor assaults
379. Id. at 3.
380. Id.
381. See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining the statistics on intake
decisions and decisions of authorities).
382. See id. (explaining that over half of the delinquency cases in 2008 were handled
formally).
383. See PUZZANCHERA, supra note 364, at 5 (showing that, in 2008, most arrested juveniles were referred to court, whereas the others were referred to a welfare agency or to another police agency).
384. See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining that in 56% of cases (or
in 924,400 cases), authorities filed a petition and the case was handled formally).
385. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM STRUCTURE & PROCESS [hereinafter STRUCTURE’S PROCESS],
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2012).
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over school-related issues, and violating curfew. Since these are the
kinds of crimes that label typically defiant youthful behavior, the of386
ficer has a great deal of discretion at this point in the process. For
example, if a child refuses to show her school identification to a hall
monitor, the officer can choose to see the child’s reaction as mouth387
ing off, or charge the child with resisting arrest.
2. Intake and Detention
Once the child has been referred to juvenile court, the child undergoes the intake process. 388 Intake usually involves the child being
389
Here too, the decision
evaluated by a juvenile probation officer.
390
As
maker has a great deal of discretion that wreaks an unfairness.
part of intake, the probation officer investigates the child’s background to make a recommendation to the court about whether the
child should be detained, released, or placed in a community-based
391
If the child has been detained, this ingroup home pending trial.
vestigation has to happen in the few short hours—usually less than
twenty-four hours—between the arrest and the youth’s first court ap392
If the child has been released, the investigation usually
pearance.
393
takes place on the morning of the court appearance.

386. See KNOLL & SICKMUND, supra note 362, at 3 (explaining that authorities can decide at intake which track to take with a case); see also WARD, supra note 4, at 159 (noting
that unconscious bias of authority figures influences whether they see juvenile behavior as
culpable or not).
387. See WARD, supra note 4, at 159 (explaining that authority figures choose, often subliminally, whether to see juvenile conduct as culpable or not).
388. STRUCTURE’S PROCESS, supra note 385.
389. Id.
390. See id. (noting that the court decides if it is in the “best interests” of the child or
community to keep the juvenile in detention, and that the prosecutor has discretion to try
the juvenile in the criminal or juvenile system).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Cf. Eugene H. Czajkoski, Exposing the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Probation Officer, 37
FED. PROBATION 9, 9–11 (1973) (noting that the probation officer has taken on a quasijudicial role and is given a high degree of discretion in making the juvenile’s placement
recommendations). The fact that the police have already made the determination that
the youth should be released, and that the youth has returned to court, usually combine to
amount to continued release, making the intake interview less urgent. Cf. Jack F. Williams,
Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325,
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In many jurisdictions, the probation officer will rely on a form
394
At
that assigns values to different parts of the child’s background.
the end of the investigation, the probation officer calculates the
child’s score, which determines the probation officer’s placement
395
recommendation. Usually, the higher the score, the more likely it is
that the probation officer will ask that the child be detained or placed
396
Some of the things that probation officers take
in a group home.
into account include: the youth’s prior criminal involvement; reports
from school officials about the youth’s attendance, grades, and behavior; reports from the youth’s parent or guardian about the youth’s
behavior at home; other features of the youth’s home environment,
like whether the youth has family members who are involved in the
juvenile or criminal justice systems; the demeanor of the youth; and
the demeanor—and, more specifically, the level of cooperation—of
397
the youth’s parent or guardian. Ostensibly race-neutral, these criteria adversely affect youths whose parents or guardians question the
child’s involvement in the juvenile justice system; whose parents or
guardians are not easily reachable by telephone; who do not have a
fixed address; who do not participate in extracurricular activities like
church, Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, or sports teams, which require money
for uniforms and other participation-related costs; and parents or
guardians with flexible schedules to ferry the youths to and from activ398
ities.
The probation officer’s range of recommendations might include some kind of deferred prosecution, where the youth’s case is
326–27 (1994) (describing the injustice and harm that results when criminal defendants
are forced to remain in pretrial detention before a hearing).
394. See, e.g., Robert D. Hoge, Standardized Instruments for Assessing Need and Risk in
Youthful Offenders, 29 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 380, 387–91 (2002) (providing examples of
several instruments used to evaluate risk and need factors).
395. See id. at 381 (explaining factors a probation officer may consider in making his
recommendation).
396. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessment of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 557 (1998)
(“[O]fficials’ judgments about the causes of crime along with relevant characteristics of a
youth’s case and criminal history will influence assessment of risk . . . .”).
397. See id. at 559; Hoge, supra note 394, at 387–91 (describing the factors considered).
398. See Bridges & Steen, supra note 396, at 557–58, 566 (explaining that officials often
view minority offenders differently, and noting that factors considered in whether the
youth may reoffend include race, assessment of the youth’s family, and the youth’s “social
history”).
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postponed for several months, and if the youth does not get rearrested in that time period, the case is dismissed; probation before judgment, where the youth enters a guilty plea, the case is postponed for
several months, and if the youth complies with certain release conditions during that time period, like clean drug tests, satisfactory school
attendance, and checking in with the probation officer, the guilty plea
is withdrawn and the case is dismissed; pretrial release with conditions; detention in a group home; or detention in a maximum securi399
In some jurisdictions, probation can entail exty juvenile facility.
plicitly recommended conditions for the youth’s parents, like
400
Even where such recommendaenrollment in parenting classes.
tions are not expressly given, in practice, any condition placed on the
youth necessarily involves the time or resources of the youth’s parent
401
or guardian, who has to help ensure the youth’s compliance.
3. Prosecutorial Charging Decision
With the police reports and the probation officer’s recommendation in hand, the juvenile prosecutor makes the charging decision.402
In juvenile court, the prosecutor enjoys full discretion to decide
whether and what charges to bring, without the check of a grand ju403
ry.

399. See Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, the “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A. Deferred Prosecution, 60 FED. PROBATION 8, 8–9 (1996) (explaining that “deferred prosecution” for juveniles occurs when the “prosecutor would hold the charges in abeyance for a specific
timeframe contingent upon good behavior. If the youngster did well on supervision, the
case was closed. In the event the supervision term was unsatisfactory, the prosecutor would
process the original complaint”).
400. See George W. Smyth, The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, 13 FED. PROBATION
12, 12 (1949) (explaining that there are “modifications which are desirable in home surroundings and parental attitudes” that will help children experience “better example and
guidance”).
401. See id. at 12–13 (“No problem of a neglected or delinquent child can be treated
successfully without also considering the attitude and actions of the parents.”).
402. See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer
to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 397 (1998) (noting the prosecutor’s “largely unchecked” discretion in charging).
403. Bowers, supra note 183, at 1659.
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The pressure for convictions, however, is no less present than in
404
While there are no studies of the exercise of
adult criminal court.
405
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile delinquency court, reference to
a study of prosecutorial charging decisions in misdemeanor criminal
406
cases, also considered low-stakes court, is instructive. As revealed by
a recent investigation of charging decisions in New York and Iowa
criminal courts, prosecutors charge misdemeanor, low-stakes offenses
407
at higher rates than serious, high-stakes felony offenses. Iowa’s 2008
declination rates show that prosecutors declined to prosecute violent
404. See Klein, supra note 402, at 397 (explaining that prosecutors may feel pressure to
prosecute children as adults, to avoid public outcry).
405. There are, however, several studies examining the transfer of juvenile cases for
prosecution in adult criminal court. See generally Klein, supra note 402.
In a November 2007 report, the Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating
the Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System, an independent task
force of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
conducted a systematic review of published scientific evidence concerning the effectiveness of laws and policies that facilitate the transfer of juveniles to the adult
criminal justice system to determine whether these transfers prevent or reduce
violence among youth who have been transferred and among the juvenile population as a whole. . . . [T]he Task Force recommends against laws or policies facilitating the transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal justice system for the purpose of reducing violence.
ROBERT HAHN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON CMTY. PREVENTIVE SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES FACILITATING THE
TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm.
406. Other similarities between juvenile court practice and misdemeanor practice make
the comparison useful. In both courts, the possible exposure is not considered as severe as
the exposure in criminal court. In misdemeanor court, defendants generally cannot be
sentenced to longer than six months incarceration for each offense charged. In juvenile
court, a youth cannot be under the court’s supervision past the upper age of juvenile court
jurisdiction, and even if the youth is committed and detained, the youth theoretically receives rehabilitative services, like education, drug treatment, vocational training and
health care. In addition, the most serious cases are weeded out of both courts. By definition, serious felonies are not tried in misdemeanor courts. Similarly, the most serious juvenile cases are often transferred for prosecution in adult criminal court, so that the only
cases processed in juvenile court are petty offenses, like assault or disorderly conduct cases
from schoolyard fights, marijuana drug possession cases, prostitution cases, and petty theft
charges.
407. Bowers, supra note 183, at 1715–17.
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felonies and misdemeanors almost three times as often as petty public
408
In addition, “all felonies were
order felonies and misdemeanors.
409
declined over fourteen times as often as all simple misdemeanors.”
The New York data yielded similar results: In charging decisions from
2005 to 2008, New York prosecutors charged petty public order
410
“[P]rosecutors even decrimes far more frequently than felonies.
clined homicide at more than twice the rate (5.01%) that they de411
clined turnstile hops or prostitution.”
This study supports anecdotal evidence that juvenile court prose412
Even in jurisdictions where the number of
cutors overcharge.
charges would make no difference in the sentence, juvenile prosecutors charge the most serious possible offense (the better to plea bargain with); the highest number of charges; and a higher number of
413
youths than circumstances might warrant. This charging practice is
ill-fitted for juvenile court particularly in light of the fact that the
overwhelming majority of youths grow out of law-offending behavior
414
without any intervention from the court.
4. Detention Decision
Though states’ statutes can vary, “[p]re-trial detention of juveniles has two general purposes: (1) to protect public safety and (2) to
415
Juvenile jurisensure the youth’s appearance at future hearings.”
prudence allows preventive detention of juveniles accused of crimes,
and statutory descriptions of factors to be considered by a court in

408. Id. at 1716–17.
409. Id. at 1716 (emphasis omitted).
410. Id. at 1718–19.
411. Id. at 1719.
412. See id. at 1712–20 (describing reasons why “disposable” cases are charged much
more frequently than serious felonies).
413. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 847–50 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Principle of Offense] (noting that juvenile sentences are “characteristically indeterminate” and
that juvenile judges have “virtually unrestricted” authority to sentence).
414. See id. at 896–902 (noting that most youths are still forming their legal, moral, and
cognitive reasoning until the age of fourteen and before this time are not fully culpable
for their decisions).
415. ELIZABETH CALVIN, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, ADVOCACY AND TRAINING
GUIDE: LEGAL STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF CHILDREN 10
(2004), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/detention_guide.pdf.
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deciding whether to detain a youth vary. “Some state laws require a
416
“Many state juvenile
‘substantial’ likelihood of failure to appear.”
justice statutes define ‘danger to the public’ to include danger to self.
Other states consider contempt of court or violation of a previous
417
probation order as factors in detention decisions.” In most jurisdictions, the judge who makes the initial pretrial detention decision will
418
preside over the trial. In the name of being fully informed to make
this decision, the judge is exposed to a range of social information—
such “broad and expansive access” that, in the opinion of one commentator, “may move the justice system dangerously close to a breach
419
of due process.”
The detention decision is integral because it impacts the youth’s
420
ability to prepare for trial. A detained youth cannot assist as well in
preparing for trial as a youth released into the community, who can
421
take an active role in case investigation. A detained youth also does
not have the opportunity to make a good impression on the court
422
that a youth in the community has. Each day that a youth is in the
community and does not reoffend is conclusive proof of the youth’s
416. Id. at 10 (“Some states, like Florida, define danger to the public narrowly, requiring a ‘substantial risk of bodily harm as evidenced by recent behavior.’”).
417. Id.
418. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 571–73 (explaining that judges often
preside over pretrial hearings and bench trials in the same case).
419. Gary Solomon, I Got the Post-McKeiver Blues, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 107 (2007);
see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication
of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005). Eisenberg
and his team studied judge-jury agreement rates in a sample of 300 criminal trials across
four jurisdictions. Id. at 173. Judges filled out two questionnaires, one pre-jury verdict and
another post-jury verdict. Id. at 175–76. The agreement rates confirmed the agreement
rates in an earlier study performed by Kalven and Zeisel: Judges and the jury agreed to
convict 75% of the time. Id. at 180–83. In 6% of the cases, the jury convicted when the
judge would have acquitted; in 19% of the cases, the jury acquitted when the judge would
have convicted. Id. at 181. Eisenberg found no correlation between the rate of disagreement and the complexity of the trial. Id. at 190–91. Instead, the juries seemed to apply a
higher standard for finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 185; see also Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 469, 478–79 (2005) (citing a similar study that found a consistent judge-jury
agreement rate around 73%).
420. Calvin, supra note 415, at 3.
421. Id.
422. Id.
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potential to be a law-abiding member of the community. In addition,
423
424
detention halls are often crowded, dangerous, and unhygienic.
Studies show that time spent in detention increases the likelihood
that a child will recidivate, in part because detention is a one-two
punch: not only is the child likely to make negative peer connec425
tions, but also any positive, community-based relationships (in particular, with the child’s family) are interrupted. In fact, detention, as
a predictor of future criminality, is more reliable than gang affiliation,
426
Indeed, detention is a
weapons possession, or family dysfunction.
427
Not
demonstrated gateway into the juvenile delinquency system.
only are children from ethnic and racial minority groups disproportionately confined at detention hearings, but they also suffer the ef428
fects of detention more acutely than other children.
5. Pretrial Hearings
On the theory that trial court judges can do the “mental gymnastics” 429 necessary to consider, but not be unduly influenced by, inad-

423. BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST. THE DANGERS OF
DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE
FACILITIES, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE REPORT 2 (2006), available at http://www.justice
policy.org/images/upload/06-11_REP_DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf.
424. See CALVIN, supra note 415, at 58–61.
425. Id. at 4–6.
426. Id. at 4.
427. Id. at 1; see also NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE IN
DETENTION ADVOCACY: GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILE DEFENDERS TO PROVIDE ZEALOUS
ADVOCACY AT DETENTION HEARINGS, available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/njdc_tools/
Guidelines.pdf (last visited Mar.13, 2013) (providing advocacy tips for representatives acting on behalf of juveniles).
428. See CALVIN, supra note 415, at 49–50, 65–69.
429. For example, many jurisdictions allow juvenile court judges to incorporate the pretrial suppression hearing testimony and the trial testimony in bench trials, and to preside
over the pleas of co-respondents. See, e.g., United States v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1250
(8th Cir. 1993) (“Someone has to decide what facts to consider and what facts to ignore.
We trust that decision-making responsibility to the trial judge. Sometimes this responsibility requires difficult mental gymnastics—as in a bench trial where the judge decides both
what facts to admit into evidence and how to weigh that evidence—but trial judges manage
such feats of objectivity all the time.”). The McKeiver appellants expressed “[c]oncern”
that “the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence[;] . . . the juvenile
court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and the contents of the so-
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missible evidence, many jurisdictions allow juvenile court judges to be
exposed to such evidence and still make the guilt or innocence de430
termination.
The potential prejudice begins just after arrest, and touches every stage of the case. The same judge who presides over the detention
hearing often also handles pretrial status hearings, at which discovery
and scheduling matters are discussed; pretrial motions and motions
431
So, for example, if the
hearings; and any co-respondents’ matters.
juvenile defense attorney files an ex parte motion for expert funds but
then does not call the expert, the judge might make a kind of impermissible missing witness inference, assuming that the expert was not
called because the expert’s testimony would have damaged the defense’s case. The judge might also preside over other matters, like entry of a guilty plea from co-respondents consideration of the circumstances of the juvenile’s confession, or possession of contraband in a
432
suppression hearing.
At each of these hearings, the court engages in a searching in433
The parent or
quiry of how the child is faring in the community.
guardian, who, in many jurisdictions, is required to come to court
with the child, is questioned about the child’s behavior at home and
school performance. The parent or guardian is also often encouraged to contact the court if the child misbehaves, as a way of getting
434
help to control the child’s behavior. So long as the court has made
a probable cause determination, at any sign that the child’s behavior

cial file; [and the] repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of
juvenile and probation officers and social workers” created “the likelihood of prejudgment.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
430. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REV. 141, 231–41 (1984).
431. Id. at 232–38.
432. See id. at 229–38 (explaining that the juvenile judge often presides over evidentiary
hearings or has information that would not be available to a jury, like a coconspirator’s
confession or evidence presented at a suppression hearing).
433. See Mary V. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 402–03
(1970) (noting that the judge may dispose of the case based on how well the child might
do if released into the community).
434. Cf. id. at 400 (noting that many juvenile systems “request that parents utilize community agencies” to help control a child who has been released into the community before
trial).
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is taking a turn for the worse, the court can change its detention deci435
sion.
6. Plea or Adjudication
In juvenile court, at the guilt or innocence determination—
called a fact finding or an adjudication—the judge must determine
whether the elements in the petition were proved beyond a reasona436
ble doubt. There is still room for the exercise of a great deal of dis437
cretion in this ostensibly straightforward and discrete task.
Several facets of juvenile court practice conspire to imperil the
integrity of the judge’s verdict at the fact finding. First, the fact that,
in most jurisdictions, the judge has an obligation to serve the child’s
438
“best interests” can compromise the judge’s role as the fact finder,
as the judge “may inappropriately lean in favor of conviction in order
to ensure youths in need of rehabilitative services will receive them as
439
All the information to
a condition of probation or placement.”
which the judge has been exposed, through pretrial litigation, corespondents’ hearings, and other sources might enable the judge to
unconsciously fail to hold the government to the beyond the reasona440
ble doubt standard in its presentation of evidence, or observe the
presumption of innocence less scrupulously, because the judge is less
441
receptive to listening to defense counsel’s counterarguments.
Second, familiarity breeds possible contravention of youths’
rights at trial. The familiarity threatens to corrupt the verdict in at
least two ways. First, judges, who hear literally hundreds of cases each

435. See id. at 399–403 (stating that the child may be released to his parents if it appears
the parents can control the child, but that if the child does not respond well to being in
the community the probation officer will take this into account in a report to the court).
436. In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
437. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 413, at 176 (noting that any time a judge is
given a standard lacking in guidelines, such as the totality of the circumstances test, it results in virtually unlimited judicial discretion).
438. Cf. Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 569–70 (arguing that “[j]udges who
conduct . . . delinquency cases . . . may over-convict in close cases out of a misguided notion that the best way to protect the community . . . is to err on the side of conviction”).
439. Id. at 570.
440. See id. at 564–67 (arguing that juvenile judges, when confronted with all the information available, frequently convict juveniles on very scant evidence).
441. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 564–71 (discussing the kinds of cases
in which juvenile judges convict youths on the scantest of evidence).
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year, “may become less careful in weighing the evidence[,] . . . more
cynical in evaluating the credibility of the juveniles who appear before
442
them,” and more trusting of the police officers whose testimony
443
Second, the familiarity encourages a
they credit again and again.
kind of informality that may allow for consideration of evidence that
444
has no bearing on the determination of guilt or innocence, and a
445
relaxation of the rules of evidence. And, since jury instructions often provide fecund grounds for appeal, and one of the efficiencies of
bench trials is that judges do not instruct themselves on the record,
juveniles tried without juries are forced to forfeit a common avenue
446
for post-adjudication relief.
7. Disposition
With the most serious crimes culled from juvenile court, the public perceives juvenile court sanctions as, at worst, a slap on the wrist,
and at best, an opportunity for the state to provide a wayward child
447
with needed services. The public’s perception is that the length of

442. Janet E. Ainsworth, The Court’s Effectiveness in Protecting the Rights of Juveniles in Delinquency Cases, 6 JUVENILE COURT 64, 68 (1996), available at http://futureofchildren.org/
futureofchildren/publications/docs/06_03_04.pdf.
443. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 191, at 574 (explaining that “judges who sit
in a criminal or juvenile court for years come to know the police officers of the jurisdiction. If the judge knows that a particular officer is a ‘good cop’ and particularly if the
judge has found that the officer testified truthfully in previous cases, the natural tendency
is to presume that the officer would not lie. As a result, the judge is less likely to subject
the officer’s testimony to the kind of critical evaluation that would expose untruths. In
cases in which an officer’s testimony is contradicted by previous statements or other officers’ testimony, the judge is likely to presume that the inconsistency stems from a mistake
or misunderstanding, rather than from fabrication.”).
444. Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 106 (2003); see also Birckhead, supra note 57.
445. Stohs, supra note 444; Birckhead, supra note 57.
446. Ainsworth, supra note 24, at 1125–26.
447. Cf. PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR.,
FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT 53 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%
20Assessment.pdf (stating that “[e]ven the senior staff and managers of some public defender offices harbor thoughts that juvenile defenders are less than ‘real lawyers’ and view
delinquency cases as ‘kiddie court.’”); GABRIELLA CELESTE & PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
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exposure is generally shorter than exposure in criminal court, because in most jurisdictions, a youth cannot be under the court’s su448
pervision past the upper age of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
449
The fact is that, in all but one state, sentencing in juvenile court is
indeterminate, and can be extended by the court in the name of the
youth’s rehabilitation, so that a youth often winds up serving a harsh450
Another
er sentence than an adult convicted of the same offense.
myth is that the nature of the exposure is also not as severe as the exposure in criminal court, since, even if the youth is detained, the
youth theoretically receives rehabilitative services, like education,
451
Studies docdrug treatment, vocational training, and health care.
ument that many juvenile system stakeholders involve youths in the
system for the express purpose of getting troubled youths services that
452
they would not otherwise be able to access in the community. The
fact is that there is a severe shortage of services available for systemCOUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN LOUISIANA 58 (2001), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf (stating that “[a] misguided perception continues to fester in the legal community that defending delinquent youth is for inexperienced
and/or lazy lawyers who are not ‘real’ criminal defense attorneys”).
448. See Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27
CRIME & JUST. 1, 54 (2000) (noting the public perception that the juvenile system is not
tough enough on juvenile offenders).
449. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.0357 (2011) (setting out sentencing standards that must
be used in the state of Washington, or, alternatively, providing for suspended disposition
alternatives, chemical dependency disposition alternatives, or “manifest injustice”).
450. In Gault, perhaps the most famous example, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was removed from his home and detained in a group home for six years for making an obscene
phone call; if he had been an adult, his sentence could not have exceeded sixty days incarceration. See supra Part II.A.3; Irene Marker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 169 n.34 (1993).
451. See Cullen, supra note 448, at 54–55 (noting that the public perception is that juveniles are treated “leniently” in the juvenile system).
452. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER
CTR., WEST VIRGINIA: ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION 61 (2010), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/West_Virginia_
Assessment.pdf (“For some children, involvement in the juvenile justice system is the only
way the family can access services.”); JESSIE BECK, PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER
STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NEBRASKA: A STUDY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
COURT 67 (2009), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/nebraska_assessment.pdf (explaining that “families often come to the county attorney’s office” and ask that charges be
filed against the child “so that the youth can receive services”).
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involved youths, whether they are placed in the community or in a de453
tention facility. As several commentators have documented, the collateral consequences for juvenile court involvement can have a pro454
found and enduring impact on the lives of system-involved youth.
8. Society’s Misperception of Juvenile Court
Two popular misperceptions of juvenile court allow discretion to
flourish unchecked. The first misconception is that any given state’s
juvenile court system, from its juvenile code to its dispositions, is
geared primarily to support the rehabilitation of a system-involved
455
While this was perhaps true in the first decades of juvenile
youth.
court’s existence, as of 1997, seventeen states had changed the purpose clauses of their juvenile codes to incorporate goals of punishment, accountability, and public safety—goals traditionally reserved
456
for the criminal justice system. And “[a]lthough many jurisdictions
still retain language suggesting rehabilitation as a goal, only three
states emphasize the best interests of the child as the primary purpose
457
of the juvenile court.”
The second misperception, a corollary to the first, is that because
the primary goal of juvenile court is rehabilitation, juvenile court is
low-stakes court, the junior varsity to the adult criminal court’s varsity
458
The most serious cases are often transferred for proseculeague.

453. See BECK, PURITZ, WALKER STERLING, supra note 452, at 68 (explaining that middle
class families in the community cannot afford services, like insurance, for their childen);
see also Mark Soler, Health Issues for Adolescents in the Justice System, 31 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 321, 321, 324 (2002) (describing the “endemic” problem of overcrowding and
lack of youth resources in the juvenile justice system).
454. See, e.g., In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 212–14 (R.I. 2008) (discussing the impacts
of requiring juveniles to register as sex-offenders).
455. But see Cullen, supra note 448, at 54–55 (noting the trend in the juvenile court system to “get tough” on juvenile offenders charged with violent crimes, and concluding that
punishment has also been integral to the corrections system).
456. See Purpose Clause, NAT’L CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.ncjj.org/
Topic/Purpose-Clause.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (excerpting various states’ purpose
clauses including Alabama, Alaska, California, the Washington, D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Washington, and Wisconsin).
457. Katherine Hunt Federle, Blended Sentencing and the Sixth Amendment, 11 A.B.A.
CHILD. RIGHTS LITIG. COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER, Summer 2009.
458. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
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tion in adult criminal court, so the cases that remain to be processed
in juvenile court are mostly petty offenses, like assault or disorderly
conduct cases from schoolyard fights, marijuana drug possession cas459
es, and petty theft charges.
C. Modern-Day Juvenile Court Case Study
Malcolm Smith, 460 a fifteen-year-old African-American boy, is
charged in juvenile court with one count of assault with a dangerous
weapon, and one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The allegations are that Malcolm had a fight with a boy at school after that
boy started a disrespectful rumor about a girl who was Malcolm’s
friend. There is a physical altercation involving several boys on each
side, during which Malcolm is alleged to have kicked the other boy.
When the police arrive on the scene, Malcolm is arrested and questioned, and gives a statement to police that he “just got mad,” that the
boy “didn’t have to say anything about [his] friend” who had lived
next door to him since he was very young and was “like a play sister,”
and that “he should know that he shouldn’t disrespect females.” Using their discretion at arrest, the police hold him in juvenile detention based on several factors, including Malcolm’s crime and his yelling at the scene, which are perceived by the police as indications that
Malcolm has anger management problems and represents a danger to
the community; his prior court history; and the fact that, when the police called Malcolm’s home, they could not locate his mother, who
was not at home at the time.
The prosecutor charges the case as assault with a dangerous
weapon, listing the weapon as Malcolm’s shoe. Because of Malcolm’s
prior offense history, the prosecutor goes forward with Malcolm’s
case. Malcolm has a prior history of two misdemeanor juvenile arrests
for disorderly conduct at school: one for wearing the wrong school
459. See PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIM: NATIONAL REPORT
SERIES: TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND
REPORTING 6–10 (2011), available at http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/Transfer_232434.pdf
(providing examples of what kinds of juvenile cases are transferred in different states).
460. This is an amalgam of juvenile cases that the author handled during the five years
that she represented indigent youth as a defense attorney, and studied during the four
years that she helped assess the juvenile indigent defense systems of several different states
for the National Juvenile Defender Center. This is an “every case,” and does not represent
any specific client, client’s family, judge, prosecutor, probation officer, police officer, or
jurisdiction.
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uniform, and the other for getting into a shouting match with a
member of a rival basketball team after a recent game. He also has a
previous adjudication for one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle
as a passenger (also known as joyriding). The prosecutor can see
from Malcolm’s court record that, although the police department
has a diversion program for first-time joyriding offenders, the police
department made the decision not to divert Malcolm’s case.
Early that morning, at the juvenile lockup at the courthouse, a
juvenile supervision officer interviews Malcolm. The probation officer notes her impressions of Malcolm as “hostile” and “needing strict
supervision.”
The next morning, the detention hearing judge, who will later
preside over Malcolm’s trial, reads the police report, which includes
Malcolm’s statement. At the detention hearing, the judge releases
Malcolm pending trial with an admonishment that the judge is expecting Malcolm to comply with the court-ordered release conditions,
which include attending school, obeying his mother, and staying at
least 100 yards away from the boy he allegedly kicked at all times.
Between the detention hearing and trial, Malcolm’s judge handled matters related to Malcolm’s case two additional times. The first
time, the judge held a hearing at which Malcolm’s probation officer
moved to have Malcolm’s release condition changed to detention in a
youth shelter home, because Malcolm was not complying with his release conditions. The trial court judge placed Malcolm in a group
home. The second time the judge considered Malcolm’s case was
when the co-respondent pleaded guilty.
On the day of trial, Malcolm’s mother is allowed into the courtroom; his pastor, coach, and friends from school are not. At the pretrial motions hearing concerning suppression of Malcolm’s statement,
which is incorporated into Malcolm’s trial, the judge finds the arrest461
At trial,
ing officer credible, and deems the statement admissible.
the complaining witness testifies that he did not know Malcolm per461. Many jurisdictions allow incorporation of the pretrial suppression hearing testimony and the trial testimony in bench trials, on the theory that trial court judges can do
the “mental gymnastics” necessary to consider, but not be unduly influenced by, inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“Someone has to decide what facts to consider and what facts to ignore. We trust that
decision-making responsibility to the trial judge. Sometimes this responsibility requires
difficult mental gymnastics—as in a bench trial where the judge decides both what facts to
admit into evidence and how to weigh that evidence—but trial judges manage such feats of
objectivity all the time.”).
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sonally though he had seen Malcolm around school, that Malcolm
yelled at him about starting a rumor about his friend, and that he was
“75% sure” that Malcolm was the one who kicked him, even though
he was curled up in a ball on the ground, and there were other boys
involved. The judge denies defense counsel’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal.
The defense does not put on any witnesses. Instead, the defense
argues, in accordance with Malcolm’s statement—which the judge
had admitted into evidence after the suppression hearing—that although Malcolm got angry, the co-defendant, and not Malcolm,
kicked the boy. Juvenile defense counsel argues that there is no eyewitness testimony showing Malcolm kicked the complainant, and that
Malcolm’s behavior after the police were called is completely consistent with innocence.
The judge finds Malcolm delinquent of assault with a dangerous
weapon, a felony, and misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The court
rules that it found the state’s two witnesses credible, and that the
court believes Malcolm was very angry, so it was “reasonable to infer,”
from his statement that Malcolm kicked the boy, though the court did
have “a doubt because no one testified that they actually saw him kick
the complainant.” The court then goes on to lecture Malcolm, saying,
“I know you feel protective of your friend, but that’s no excuse to start
a fight. You and your brother have both been in trouble enough to
know better.” When Malcolm started to speak up and say that he did
not kick the boy, the judge interrupted him, saying “you had your
chance, now it’s my turn. I’ve found that you committed this assault,
so, according to the law, you did it.” Malcolm stands and silently cries
through the rest of the hearing. Outside the courtroom, he tells his
attorney, “the judge just could not see that I didn’t do it. He just
couldn’t see it.”
The salient themes in this typical modern day narrative take on a
stark meaning in light of the social and legal histories of juvenile
court jurisprudence. Social control, lack of parental empowerment,
reservation of resources for other children, and the presumption of
criminality all have deep roots in the juvenile court’s historical treatment of black children.
At first blush, it might seem that overruling Gault and applying a
model of constitutional jurisprudence built on Bill of Rights protections in juvenile court proceedings would not address juvenile courts’
462
deficiencies. But the jurisprudential reach of Gault, as the case that
462. See supra Part IV.A.
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created the modern-day juvenile court system, extends far beyond its
463
practical effects. Like other landmark Supreme Court decisions,
464
465
such as Plessy v. Ferguson, Gideon v. Wainwright, Brown v. Board of
466
467
468
Education, Bowers v. Hardwick, and McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gault is more than a simple pronouncement of jurisprudential rules of decision for specific issues. It transcends its circumscribed holdings to stand as a prototype of ideals
regarding how the juvenile justice system should run and what cultur469
al values the system will reflect. This prototype affects how all of the
players in the system view their goals and roles, duties and limitations;
and it affects what the public and the public’s legislative and adminis470
trative representatives think that the system should be about.
471
Gault’s great failing is that it erects a deficient prototype. Replacing
that prototype with a better one will not itself cure juvenile court’s deficiencies, but it will create an institutional environment in which a
wide range of players can work more effectively toward a wide range
of cures for many of the problems.
V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between the history of the treatment of systeminvolved black children and the doctrine that evolved because of the
Court’s omission of that history lays bare several important realiza472
The first is that the absence of one narrative can have as
tions.
473
This kind of
much of an impact as inclusion of another narrative.
narrative privileging led to the Court’s failure to recognize the potential for civil rights reforms in juvenile court in In re Gault, and instead
focus on the admittedly rehabilitative, informal nature of juvenile
463. See supra Part IV.A.
464. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
465. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
466. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
467. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
468. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
469. Cf. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of the
United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J POL. SCI. 971, 975–76 (1996) (noting that landmark decisions often impose tests or standards to be followed).
470. See supra Part IV.A.
471. See supra Part IV.
472. See supra Part I.B.
473. See supra Part II.A.
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court allowed the Court to continue to sidestep that narrative aside in
McKeiver—even though McKeiver presented the Burrus narrative for
474
the Court’s fair consideration.
The second is that the history and the doctrine collude to perpetuate the problem of disproportionate minority contact in the ju475
venile system. Interlocked in the cells of the juvenile justice system—like complimentary strands of DNA—each makes its own
476
contributions to modern-day disproportionate minority contact.
The history contributes the weight of decades of stereotypes and bias;
the doctrine contributes pockets of discretion, like the guise of “best
interests,” making youths vulnerable to exploitation by these stereo477
types and bias. Neither, standing alone, is the cause. The result is a
seemingly intractable, systemic problem that has no head and no tail,
so it is unclear where to strike first.
Accordingly, augmenting Gault’s protections with a case that extends the Bill of Rights to juvenile court—the way the Court augmented Powell with its decision in Gideon—as this Article suggests, is
478
only part of the solution. After all, black adults are overrepresented
in the criminal justice system, and they enjoy the due process protec479
But, cultural solutions that address the
tions of the Bill of Rights.
historical dimension of disproportionate minority contact can and
480
must be undertaken as well.
The third is that examining the evolution of the doctrine, in light
of the overlooked history, is a methodology that has implications beyond the jury trial question in juvenile court. This methodology is, in
481
effect, a look at the flip side of interest convergence, and it links juvenile justice to other social movements in which the experience of a
subset of an oppressed group are subsumed by the narrative of the

474. See supra Parts II–III.
475. See supra Parts I.B.4, IV.A.
476. See supra Parts I.B.4, IV.A.
477. See supra Parts II–III.
478. See supra Part II.A.
479. See supra notes 142–149 and accompanying text.
480. See supra Part IV.A.
481. Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest convergence” holds that white people
will support racial justice only to the extent that there is a “convergence” between the interests of the white people and racial justice. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
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482

dominant voice in the group.
If the needs of the subsumed group
(here, black system-involved children) are not taken into account during the reform period, there is a risk that the subsumed group will not
profit from the jurisprudential, social, and other gains the way the
483
dominant group (white system-involved children) might. While the
“children are different” argument is being so prominently used to argue the severity of penalties for juveniles tried as adults for very serious crimes, it is important to remember that when the Child Savers
championed their version of the “children are different” argument,
484
they did not mean black children.
The fact is that it feels as though the juvenile justice system has
taken on a life of its own, evolving into more than the sum of the millions of prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and probation officers
who make up its parts, and accomplish with almost unassailable efficiency the kind of disparate treatment that would have made Governor George Wallace proud. This situation could not be so unless the
law allows it to be so; this situation could not be so unless the culture
allows it to be so. This methodology allows full consideration of both
why and how this phenomenon has come about, and development of
a complete solution to address it.

482. See supra Parts I, II.A.
483. Cf. Phyllis M. Palmer, White Women/Black Women: The Dualism of Female Identity and
Experience in the United States, 9 FEMINIST STUD, 151, 151–54 (1983) (describing the trend in
the women’s movement of black women’s narrative being subsumed by the larger reform
movement and the overall “invisibility” of black women in this period of American history).
484. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012), a case that recently came before the Court and held that mandatory life without
parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional, racial issues were explicitly raised by
the NAACP, which filed an amicus brief. Brief for NAACP as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646 & 10-9647), 2012 WL 135045, at *30
(arguing that “race critically and inappropriately influences the assessment of blameworthiness in the context of juvenile life without parole sentencing”); see also Robin Walker
Sterling, “Children are Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013).

